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EQUITY AND FEASIBILITY REGULATION
Dov Waisman *
INTRODUCTION
Two major approaches to regulating industrial health risks
have emerged over the past fifty or so years.1 Feasibility analy-
sis-the approach required by parts of the Clean Air Act of 1970
("Clean Air Act"),2 the Clean Water Act of 1972 ("Clean Water
Act"),' and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970'
("OSH Act")-says to reduce risks to the maximum extent possi-
ble without threatening the existence or competitive stability of
the regulated industries.' By contrast, cost-benefit analysis
("CBA")-the approach that has dominated regulatory policy
since the Reagan administration--says to reduce risks to the
point at which net social benefits would be maximized,7 that is, to
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. A.B., Harvard College; M.A.,
Philosophy, U.C. San Diego; J.D., U.C.L.A. I am indebted to Alan Calnan, Michael Dorff,
David Driesen, Dave Fagundes, Johann Frick, Barbara Fried, Ezra Goldschlager, Warren
Grimes, Danielle Kie Hart, Aaron James, Greg Keating, Hila Keren, David Neumark, Shi-
ra Sergant, and Byron Stier for their feedback and support. My thanks also to participants
in the 2014 Harvard-Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum and the 2015 Southern Califor-
nia Junior Law Faculty Workshop. I thank Andy Lugo and Sharrel Gerlach for excellent
research assistance. Of course, any errors are mine.
1. A third and somewhat less prevalent approach to risk regulation is the "health-
based" or "safety-based' approach, which requires risks to be eliminated or reduced to a
specified level, regardless of cost or impact on industry. See Michael A. Livermore & Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1184, 1193-94 (2014) (describing health-based standards as "the third principal approach
to determining the stringency of environmental regulation," after designating cost-benefit
analysis and feasibility analysis as the other two major approaches).
2. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (2012).
3. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(b)(2)(A)(i), 1316(a)(1), 1316(b)(1)(B) (2012).
4. See Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012).
5. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (explaining economic feasibility for purposes of the OSH Act).
6. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993) (ordering regulatory
agencies to conduct CBA for all significant regulations); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127, 128 (1981).
7. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1190 ("Cost-benefit analysis, in its most
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invest in risk reduction up to (but not beyond) the point at which
further investment would cost more than it would save in acci-
dent costs.8
Although the normative basis of CBA is generally agreed to be
some form of welfarism,9 consensus over the normative basis of
feasibility analysis has been more elusive. The feasibility ap-
proach has alternately been defended on the basis of fairness,
10
Rawlsian social contract theory," and, most recently, welfarism
informed by a "concentration principle.' 2
The absence of consensus as to the normative basis of feasibil-
ity analysis has left it vulnerable to attack. Most prominently,
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner have charged that the feasibil-
ity approach is normatively indefensible and has no place in risk
regulation.3 Masur and Posner contend that feasibility regulation
general form, places both costs and benefits along a common metric and supports the
standard that maximizes net benefits (the difference between benefits and costs).").
8. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 697 (2010) ("According to economic analysis, a firm should engage in a pre-
caution when the marginal benefits (in terms of reduced risk of harm to workers and oth-
ers) exceed the marginal costs.").
9. The term welfarism, term in this article, see infra text accompanying note 116, is
the view that the normatively appropriate action or policy is that which maximizes social
welfare (overall well-being). See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-
Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 269, 274 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Pos-
ner eds., 2001) ("IThere is a genuine normative criterion that does plausibly justify the
use of CBA, and that is the criterion of overall well-being.").
10. See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1255-57 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW]; ROBERT E.
KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH, & GREGORY C. KEATING, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 20-6-20-12 (3d ed. 1998).
11. See Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Acci-
dents, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 22, 23 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) [here-
inafter Keating, Social Contract] (using social contract theory to analyze accident law);
Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 653, 681 (2003) [hereinafter Keating, Pressing Precaution] (discussing social con-
tract theory and interpersonal comparison to assess how to measure risk imposition and
comparable harm).
12. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005) [hereinafter Driesen, Feasibility Principle] (noting
that the concentration principle is useful in determining the significance of cost distribu-
tion); David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur
and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319, 339 (2011) [hereinafter Driesen, Two
Cheers] (explaining that concentrated costs have harmful impacts).
13. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 661-62; see also Livermore & Revesz, supra
note 1, at 1193 (endorsing Masur and Posner's normative critique of feasibility-based reg-
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promotes overall well-being less effectively than CBA does,1" and
has no clearly identifiable nonwelfarist rationale." Feasibility
regulation has also been attacked on the grounds that it delivers
indefensible results. A number of scholars have charged that fea-
sibility analysis results both in "overregulation" that requires un-
justifiably large investments in risk reduction"6 and in "under-
regulation" that tolerates unjustifiably dangerous industrial
practices.7
If this line of criticism were correct, there would be cause for
serious concern. Important parts of the Clean Air Act, Clean Wa-
ter Act, and OSH Act-statutes which together comprise the
foundation of environmental and workplace safety legislation in
the United States-would lack a normative basis, and that would
be deeply troubling. The stakes are high when it comes to the
regulation of the risks industrial activity poses to human health.
Not only do people's lives hang in the balance, but so does the
long-term vitality of the nation's economy. For federal law to be
getting risk regulation fundamentally wrong by taking a feasibil-
ity approach would be an intolerable state of affairs.
Thankfully, the feasibility approach is normatively sound. This
article offers a novel account of its normative basis. The norm
underlying feasibility regulation is equity. Closely related to the
notion of fairness, equity is specifically concerned with equalizing
ulation).
14. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 699-707.
15. See id. at 707-09, 707 n.224. Masur and Posner summarily dismiss the possibility
that the feasibility principle rests on deontological considerations, and fail to consider the
possibility of it resting on social contract theory. See id. at 707.
16. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 110 (2006) (noting that "a regulation that does not bankrupt an indus-
try may nonetheless lower overall welfare"); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 7 (2010) (noting that
economic reformers object to feasibility analysis on the grounds that "[i]t is simply not the
case ... that more protection is always better"); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at
1193 (stating the over-regulation objection); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 702 ("A
regulation that reduces risks of harm very little, while imposing very high costs on con-
sumers, should not be issued even if it does not close any plants."); id. at 704 ("Overregu-
lation occurs because feasibility analysis ignores the cost of regulations to consumers-the
costs they incur because prices rise or products disappear from the market.").
17. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 9, at 110 (observing that "a sufficiently harm-
ful industry should be bankrupted"); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1193 (stating
the underregulation objection); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 704 ('Underregulation
occurs because feasibility analysis tolerates dangerous industrial practices if regulation
would shut down plants.").
2016] 1265
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the burdens borne and benefits enjoyed by differently situated
individuals as the result of some collectively beneficial activity or
policy. It is precisely this concern that underlies feasibility regu-
lation.
CBA, at least in its most traditional form, is driven by a con-
cern for maximizing social welfare. CBA is commonly defended on
the grounds that it results in the greatest increase in the welfare
of society as a whole.'" The argument for feasibility regulation is
that, although it may sometimes lead to a somewhat lower level
of overall well-being, it typically results in a more equitable dis-
tribution of the burdens and benefits of risky industrial activities.
Quite often, the health risks posed by a toxic substance or
emission are concentrated on a relatively small group of workers
or plant neighbors, while the costs of mitigating those risks are
distributed among a vast number of consumers or shareholders.9
In this common scenario, a substantial reduction in each risk-
bearer's risk of suffering death or serious bodily harm can typical-
ly be achieved at a cost that, while perhaps significant in the ag-
gregate, is trivial for each person responsible for bearing such
costs. Equity requires that such regulatory investments be made,
even if they are excessive from the perspective of CBA.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
provides an illustrative example in its recent regulation of occu-
pational exposure to hexavalent chromium, a carcinogenic sub-
stance used in a number of industries. In 2006, following its stat-
utory mandate, OSHA fixed the new permissible exposure limit
("PEL") for chromium at what it determined to be the lowest fea-
sible level of 5 micrograms per cubic meter ("tg/m"), despite that
the cost-justified PEL was, on a plausible set of assumptions, de-
termined to be 10 gg/m3. ° In other words, OSHA determined that
setting the chromium PEL at the lowest feasible level of 5 gg/m'
would result in a net loss to social welfare compared to the cost-
justified level of 10 jig/m'. What, then, could possibly have been
the rationale for doing so?
18. See, e.g., Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1190.
19. See infra Part IV.A.3.
20. See infra Table 1 and sources cited therein.
[Vol. 50:12631266
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The answer lies in a consideration of the costs and benefits of
chromium regulation for each affected individual. While each
worker's annual risk of developing fatal lung cancer was 1 in 769
at the 10 ig/m3 level, the risk fell to 1 in 1521 if the chromium
PEL was reduced to 5 ig/m3.2' While a rational worker would be
willing to pay more than $4000 for this reduction,22 the $112 mil-
lion total cost of accomplishing that reduction for all workers was
likely to be distributed among millions of consumers, making the
cost less than (and probably much less than) $100 per consumer.23
Thus, a safety benefit worth more than $4000 to each worker
could be provided at a cost of less than $100 for each consumer.
Considerations of equity therefore weighed strongly in favor of
reducing the chromium PEL to 5 pg/m3, notwithstanding that so-
cial welfare would have been maximized at the more lenient PEL
of 10 tg/m3 .24 This line of reasoning generally justifies the feasi-
bility point as a floor for risk regulation and responds to the ob-
jection that feasibility analysis unjustifiably overregulates rela-
tive to CBA.
There is also a sound normative basis for imposing the feasibil-
ity point as a ceiling for risk regulation.25 Capping regulatory in-
vestments at the feasibility point makes sense provided that, at
that point, the industry remains socially beneficial in a plural-
istic, "all things considered" sense to be specified in Part IV. In
such circumstances, requiring investment beyond the feasibility
point is tantamount to requiring the disruption of an industrial
activity that, from a moral point of view, improves the state of the
world on net and ought to be pursued. This point generally justi-
fies the feasibility point as a ceiling for risk regulation and re-
sponds to the objection that feasibility analysis unjustifiably un-
derregulates relative to CBA.
This article has four parts. Parts I through III set the stage.
Part IV contains the heart of the argument. Part I generally de-
scribes feasibility-based regulation, with an emphasis on how it
has been implemented by OSHA. Part II describes and critiques
21. See infra Table 1 and sources cited therein.
22. This follows from OSHA's use of a $6.8 million value of a statistical life. See infra
p. 1308.
23. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
24. See infra pp. 1309, 1311.
25. See infra Part IV.B.
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the existing justifications that have been offered for the feasibil-
ity approach, focusing on those proposed by David Driesen and
Gregory Keating. Part III describes the most promising norma-
tive basis for the feasibility approach: the norm of equity, as that
norm is interpreted by a strand of social contract theory known
as contractualism. Part III also introduces normative pluralism-
the view that moral judgment should embrace considerations of
both equity and overall well-being-which constitutes the "mas-
ter theory" on which this article's defense of feasibility regulation
rests. Part IV explains how normative pluralism generally and
contractualism specifically can justify the feasibility point as both
a floor and a ceiling for risk regulation.
I. WHAT Is FEASIBILITY REGULATION?
The use of the term "feasible" in the regulatory context appears
to have originated with the OSH Act.26 The OSH Act provides
that, in promulgating regulatory standards for toxic materials or
other hazardous substances, OSHA
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even
if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life.27
The Supreme Court has defined the term "feasible" in this con-
text to mean "capable of being done," and on that basis held that
the OSH Act's use of that term precluded consideration of cost in
setting regulatory standards.28 In a seminal case relating to this
statute, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the feasi-
bility standard to impose two distinct sub-requirements-
technological feasibility and economic feasibility29 -each of which
is discussed in detail below.
In this article, the term "feasibility-based regulation" refers not
only to workplace safety regulations enacted under the authority
26. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 663 ("The term 'feasibility analysis' derives
from the Occupational Safety and Health Act ... ").
27. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (empha-
sis added).
28. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
29. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978).
1268 [Vol. 50:1263
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of the OSH Act, but also to environmental regulations enacted
under the authority of the Clean Air Act"° and Clean Water Act.3'
Though the term "feasible" may not appear in these statutes, the
"best available technology" and "best practicable technology"
standards the statutes impose have commonly been interpreted
to contemplate the same sort of feasibility analysis used in the
OSH Act context.32
A. Technological Feasibility
To establish that a proposed regulatory standard is technologi-
cally feasible, it must be shown by "the best available evidence"
that there is a "reasonable possibility that the typical firm will be
able to develop and install engineering and work practice controls
that can meet the [proposed standard] in most of its operations."3
This showing can be made by "pointing to technology that is ei-
ther already in use or has been conceived and is reasonably capa-
ble of experimental refinement and distribution within the
standard's deadlines.34
The technological feasibility requirement is commonly associ-
ated with the judicial observation that the feasibility standard is
intended to be "technology-forcing.'3' This means, at a minimum,
that a standard that "only the most technologically advanced
plants in an industry have been able to achieve ... in some of
their operations some of the time" may be considered technologi-
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) (requiring new facilities to employ "the best
available control technology for each pollutant"); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining "best avail-
able control technology" as a technology providing "the maximum degree of reduction of
each pollutant.., which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into ac-
count energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achiev-
able for such facility...").
31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (requiring "the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact"); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring "application of the
best available technology economically achievable").
32. See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of ORA, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1097, 1101-02 (2006) (arguing the Clean Water Act's "technology-based re-
quirements are not ... based on cost-benefit analysis"); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at
664 ("Environmental statutes involve an extensive array of verbal formulations, some of
which appear to trigger feasibility analysis.").
33. See United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1272.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1264 (citing AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975)). But
see Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 691-92 (claiming that agencies "rarely issue technol-
ogy-forcing regulations").
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cally feasible for the entire industry to adopt.36 The technological
feasibility requirement may even permit the imposition of a
standard that could only be met if firms within an industry de-
veloped and employed an entirely new technology.37 As the D.C.
Circuit observed, OSHA is not required "to prove with any cer-
tainty that industry will be able to develop the necessary technol-
ogy, or even to identify the single technological means by which it
expects industry to meet the [permissible exposure limit] .' 3
OSHA need only "show that modern technology has at least con-
ceived some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to be
capable of meeting the PEL and which the industries are general-
ly capable of adopting.,
39
B. Economic Feasibility
A regulatory standard is economically feasible if the costs of
implementing it "will not threaten the existence or competitive
structure of an industry, even if it does portend disaster for some
marginal firms."4 ° In other words, the economic feasibility princi-
ple says to reduce a given risk to the maximum extent possible
without threatening the long-term viability of the industrial ac-
tivity giving rise to the risk.41 As one oft-quoted opinion explains,
A standard is feasible if it does not threaten 'massive dislocation' to,
or imperil the existence of, the industry. No matter how initially
frightening the projected total or annual costs of compliance appear,
a court must examine those costs in relation to the financial health
and profitability of the industry and the likely effect of such costs on
unit consumer prices .... [Tihe practical question is whether the
standard threatens the competitive stability of an industry, or
36. United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1264.
37. See id. at 1264-65 ("So long as it presents substantial evidence that companies
acting vigorously and in good faith can develop the technology, OSHA can require industry
to meet PEL's never attained anywhere.").
38. Id. at 1266.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1272; see also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530
n.55 (1981) (holding cotton dust standard economically feasible because "the industry will
maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness").
41. It seems clear that the economically feasible level of precaution must necessarily
be technologically feasible, i.e., must be achievable within the limits of available technolo-
gy. Obviously, requiring a degree of safety that is technologically unattainable is incon-
sistent with the survival of the activity at issue.
1270 [Vol. 50:1263
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whether any intra-industry or inter-industry discrimination in the
standard might wreck such stability or lead to undue concentra-
tion.42
Because economic feasibility is determined on an industry-wide
basis, it does not "necessarily guarantee the continued existence
of individual employers."3 Thus, "[a] standard is not infeasible
simply because it is financially burdensome. .. or even because it
threatens the survival of some companies within an industry."
44
In a given case, how do regulators determine whether the im-
position of a particular standard threatens the existence or com-
petitive stability of an industry? OSHA approaches this question
in the first instance by conducting an industry-by-industry analy-
sis. For each industry, OSHA determines the percentage of the
industry's revenues and profits that the costs of complying with
the standard represent.45 On this point, one OSHA report offers
the following guidance:
[W]hile there is no hard and fast rule, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary OSHA generally considers a standard economically fea-
sible when the costs of compliance are less than one percent of reve-
nues. Common-sense considerations indicate that potential impacts
of such a small magnitude are unlikely to eliminate an industry or
significantly alter its competitive structure particularly since most
industries have at least some ability to raise prices to reflect in-
creased costs .... There is an enormous variety of year-to-year
events that could cause a one percent increase in a business's costs,
e.g., increasing fuel costs, an unusual one-time expense, changes in• . .46
costs of materials, increased rents, increased taxes, etc.
42. United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1265 (discussing Indust. Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (internal citations omitted); see
also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc., 452 U.S. at 531 (describing OSHA's determination that
proposed standard for workplace cotton dust exposure was economically feasible because,
"although some marginal employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry as a
whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements of the regulation") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
43. United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO, 499 F.2d at 478).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100,
10,271-82 tbl.VIII-7 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (describing re-
sults of industry-by-industry analysis of economic impact of proposed permissible expo-
sure limit for hexavalent chromium).
46. Id. at 10,299-300 (emphasis added). The sort of "standard" at issue in OSHA
health regulations is one that identifies a PEL for a particular toxic substance.
20161 1271
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In at least one instance, OSHA concluded that where the costs
of complying with a particular standard come to less than both
1% of an industry's revenues and 10% of its profits, implementa-
tion of the standard would not threaten the existence or competi-
tive stability of the industry." The reasoning here seems to be
that if an industry is routinely able to absorb revenue and profit
fluctuations within certain limits without seeing its existence or
competitive stability undermined, then a regulatory standard
whose implementation would cause a revenue or profit fluctua-
tion within those same limits would not threaten the industry's
existence or competitive stability.
Where a particular industry's compliance costs significantly
exceed the threshold levels designated by OSHA (which are typi-
cally stated as a percentage of the industry's revenues and prof-
its), OSHA determines whether complying with a particular
standard will threaten the industry's existence or competitive
stability. For example, in analyzing the economic feasibility of
PELs for hexavalent chromium, OSHA expressed concern about
how a PEL of 1 g g/m3 would affect the electroplating industry:
OSHA is concerned about the economic feasibility of the standard for
electroplating at a PEL of 1 [gg/m']. At this lower PEL, costs of the
standard represent 2.7 percent of revenues and 65 percent of prof-
its.... It seems unlikely that a price increase of 2.7 percent ...
would eliminate the industry entirely. OSHA has concluded, howev-
er, that the costs associated with such a PEL could alter the compet-
itive structure of the industry. OSHA has concluded this because
these costs substantially exceed the average nominal price increases
in the industry, and the reasons for these nominal price increases-
increases in the cost of labor and energy, for example-will continue.
Thus a price increase that would assure continued profitability for
the entire industry would require almost tripling the annual nomi-
nal price increase .... That would represent a significant real price
increase that might not be passed forward, particularly by older and
less profitable segments of the industry.
48
47. See id. at 10,300 ('The record does not contain evidence that any of the affected
industries for which OSHA found that the costs of complying with the standard will be
less than both one percent of prior revenue and ten percent of prior profits will in fact be
threatened by the standard.... [Clost changes of less than one percent are routinely
passed on and impacts that are less than 10 percent of profits have not been shown to be
likely to affect the viability or competitive structure of any of the industries affected by
this standard.").
48. See id. at 10,301-02.
1272 [Vol. 50:1263
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The touchstone of OSHA's analysis here seems to be ensuring
continued profitability,49 which leads naturally to a focus on de-
mand elasticity, i.e., the extent to which demand for the indus-
try's product or service will be affected by fluctuations in price."0
The less elastic the demand, the more an industry can pass on
compliance costs to consumers without suffering a reduction in
demand and a consequent reduction in profitability. Though, in
the above case, OSHA concluded that "demand for electroplating
services is relatively inelastic," making possible some degree of
cost pass-through, it also concluded that the costs of compliance
with the proposed standard (2.7% of revenues) were too large to
be entirely passed on to consumers in the form of real price in-
creases.5' The implication seems to be that compliance with the
proposed standard would mean diminishing electroplating firms'
profits so much as to effectively make electroplating an unprofit-
able enterprise for at least some segments of the industry in
question. That, OSHA implies, is at least part of what is meant
by threatening the "competitive stability" or altering the "compet-
itive structure" of an industry.52
C. Is Feasibility Regulation Feasible?
This article's primary concern is to articulate and defend a
novel normative basis for the feasibility approach to risk regula-
tion. The important practical question of implementation-how
exactly a regulatory agency ought to determine how much regula-
tion an industry can tolerate without seeing its existence threat-
ened or its competitive stability undermined53-is largely outside
the scope of discussion here. However, it will be helpful to briefly
explain why the practical challenges presented by feasibility
analysis are not insurmountable.
49. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55 (1981) (hold-
ing cotton dust standard economically feasible because "the industry will maintain long-
term profitability and competitiveness").
50. See id. at 533 n.61, 534.
51. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,301.
52. See id. at 10,102, 10,211.
53. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 702 & n.188 (charging that feasibility-based
regulation "does not explain how far regulation should go: at what point should we regard
suppression of economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that reduces risk?").
2016] 1273
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Regulatory agencies, with OSHA as the leading example, have
developed a sensible general approach to implementing feasibility
regulation. For example, with respect to economic feasibility,
54
OSHA's general approach is to calculate regulatory costs as a
percentage of total industry revenues, and total industry profits
and determine whether the industry has previously absorbed
losses of similar magnitude without serious disruption.5 Masur
and Posner's critique of this approach is not that it fails as a reli-
able indicator of whether the existence or competitive stability of
the regulated industries will be threatened. Instead, Masur and
Posner contend only that, relative to CBA,56 this approach results
in underregulation in some circumstances (e.g., where industry
profits or revenues are low), and overregulation in others (e.g.,
where industry profits or revenues are high).7 Even if Masur and
Posner are right about this, they will have shown only that feasi-
bility analysis must be defended on the basis of a norm other
than overall well-being. This article agrees with that proposition
and argues that equity is the alternative norm that supports fea-
sibility-based regulation.
Although there is undoubtedly room for improvement in some
of the more specific aspects of agencies' implementation of the
feasibility approach,8 that is no reason to believe that it is inco-
herent or impractical to key risk regulation to the long-term sur-
vival of the regulated industries. Nor is it reason to question
OSHA's basic practice of using an industry's revenues and profits
to gauge the likely effect of regulatory costs on the industry's sur-
vival and competitive stability.
54. On the distinction between economic feasibility and technological feasibility, see
infra Part I.
55. See infra Part I.B.
56. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 697 ("We can divide the deviations into two
categories-cases where feasibility analysis results in underregulation (relative to econom-
ic optimality) and cases where it results in overregulation.") (emphasis added).
57. See id. at 697-98.
58. For example, Masur and Posner may be correct that OSHA's use of a 10%-of-
industry-revenues and 1%-of-industry-profits threshold for determining economic feasibil-
ity is somewhat arbitrary. See id. at 679; infra Part I.B. Masur and Posner may also be
correct that regulatory agencies have inappropriately deviated from courts' directives, see
infra Part L.A and judicial opinions cited therein, that the technological feasibility re-
quirement be "technology-forcing." See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 692 (claiming
that agencies "rarely issue technology-forcing regulations").
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II. EXISTING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FEASIBILITY-BASED
REGULATION
This part describes and critiques the two most prominent justi-
fications for feasibility-based regulation that have been offered to
date, those provided by David Driesen and Gregory Keating. For
reasons described below, neither account provides an entirely sat-
isfying response to the criticism that feasibility analysis indefen-
sibly results in overregulation and underregulation relative to
CBA.
A. Overall Well-Being and the "Concentration Principle' Driesen
David Driesen is perhaps the most prominent defender of fea-
sibility-based regulation.59 Driesen defines the feasibility ap-
proach as one which "authorizes government agencies to forego
physically impossible environmental improvements [and] forego
constraints so costly that they cause widespread plant shut-
downs."6 Focusing on the distribution of the costs and benefits of
regulation, Driesen defends feasibility-based regulation on the
basis of what he calls the "concentration principle":
When economic losses become concentrated in ways that devastate
individuals, they can have drastic effects, even if the total amount of
cost is low. Conversely, widely distributed costs can have minor ef-
fects, even if total aggregate costs are high. This "concentration"
principle suggests that the distribution of costs can tell us a lot
about their significance.
6
1
How, in Driesen's view, does the concentration principle support
feasibility-based regulation? The concentration principle states
that regulatory standards should be made sensitive to concen-
59. Driesen has authored no less than three published papers defending the feasibil-
ity approach (one of which is co-authored). See generally Driesen, Feasibility Principle,
supra note 12; Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12; Amy Sinden et al., Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48, 63-66 (making clear
Driesen was the author of the subsection on feasibility analysis). Masur and Posner focus
almost exclusively on Driesen's work in their critique of feasibility-based regulation. See
Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 700 (identifying Driesen as the "leading defender of fea-
sibility analysis").
60. Driesen, Feasibility Principle, supra note 12, at 9.
61. Id. at 35; see also Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 319 ("In Feasibility
[Principle], I developed a concentration principle: widely distributed costs almost always
have minor effects, while concentrated costs (or harms, if you'd prefer) can have devastat-
ing impacts.").
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trated harms such as death, devastating injury, or job loss, but
not to de minimis costs like modest increases in the price of con-
sumer products.62 To the extent the costs of safety regulations can
be spread among a very large group of people-for example, by
incrementally raising the price of a particular good-the regula-
tion at issue becomes effectively costless according to Driesen's
concentration principle.3 It follows that, so long as the costs of
regulation can be widely distributed among consumers or another
large group of persons, regulation that reduces risks of death and
devastating injury should continue. Regulation should cease only
when further risk reduction would be expected to result in a con-
centrated harm. The concentrated harm Driesen focuses on is job
loss, specifically the job losses resulting from a widespread clo-
sure of plants.4 For Driesen, the feasibility principle reflects the-
se judgments by requiring the reduction of risks of death and
devastating injury up to the point at which widespread plant clo-
sures, and the job losses they cause, would occur.65
Driesen characterizes this justification of feasibility regulation
as welfarist in nature. "Feasibility analysis," he claims, "more
comprehensively considers aspects of welfare that are central to
environmental regulation, and should therefore be considered a
procedure focused on welfare."6 Thus, for Driesen, the feasibility
approach and the concentration principle on which it is founded
are justified because they promote overall well-being more effec-
tively than CBA does.67
62. See Driesen, Feasibility Principle, supra note 12, at 35-41.
63. See Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 324 ("Even if some consequences exist,
when costs are widely distributed, they simply deserve no weight compared to the concen-
trated harms that individual victims of pollution experience, such as hospitalization for
asthma or death from cancer.") (emphasis added).
64. See Driesen, Feasibility Principle, supra note 12, at 37; Driesen, Two Cheers, su-
pra note 12, at 321-22; Sinden et al., supra note 59, at 65.
65. See Driesen, Feasibility Principle, supra note 12, at 3; Driesen, Two Cheers, supra
note 12, at 323.
66. Sinden et al., supra note 59, at 64 (emphasis added); see also Driesen, Feasibility
Principle, supra note 12, at 70; Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 322-26; Sinden et
al., supra note 59, at 65 ("[B]oth CBA and feasibility analysis, however, are more accurate-
ly viewed as narrow welfarist procedures, albeit with differing foci."); id. ("Feasibility
analysis, however, is more likely [than CBA] to track overall wellbeing, as it focuses on
factors that are important and survive idealization.").
67. Masur and Posner reach the same conclusion about the welfarist nature of Drie-
sen's account. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 700.
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Driesen's defense of feasibility regulation has not been terribly
convincing to defenders of CBA. For example, Masur and Posner
have charged that Driesen's concentration principle cannot ade-
quately justify the feasibility point as either a floor or a ceiling for
risk regulation.68
The central virtue of Driesen's account is that it correctly rests
the case for feasibility-based regulation on a comparison of the
harms and costs experienced by differently situated individuals,
as opposed to harms and costs considered in the aggregate. Drie-
sen is on the right track in focusing his defense of the feasibility
approach on the distribution of costs, harms, and risks.
There is, however, reason to question whether Driesen has
provided a welfarist justification for feasibility-based regulation.
Driesen's insistence that widely-distributed monetary costs
"simply deserve no weight"69 and ought to be ignored is, as Masur
and Posner note, "deeply puzzling from a welfarist perspective.""
Welfarism would deny, for example, that the imposition of a $1
cost on each of 100,000 people deserves no weight. The impact
might be trivial for each affected person, but standard welfar-
ism's commitment to the interpersonal aggregation of costs and
benefits might well lead to the conclusion that the impact on
overall well-being is significant when summed across all 100,000
affected individuals.
By contrast, Driesen's claim that widely distributed costs
"simply deserve no weight compared to the concentrated harms
that individual victims of pollution experience"'" seems to involve
an implicit appeal to considerations of fairness or equity. Once a
normative judgment is based on a comparison between the loss
suffered by one person and the loss suffered by another, the
realm of fairness and equity has been entered and the realm of
welfarism left behind.2 Thus, even if one were to accept Driesen's
defense of feasibility regulation on the basis of the concentration
68. See id. at 703.
69. See Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 324.
70. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 703.
71. See Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 324 (emphasis added).
72. See John Broome, Fairness, in 91 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 87,
95 (1990-91) ("[Flairness is concerned only with how well each person's claim is satisfied
compared with how well other people's are satisfied. It is concerned only with relative sat-
isfaction, not absolute satisfaction.").
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principle, there is good reason to question Driesen's claim that
this defense is ultimately welfarist in nature.
To the extent Driesen's defense actually sounds in equity, ra-
ther than welfarism, the defense is theoretically underdeveloped.
As discussed in Part III, the notion of equity is rather abstract
and, to be deployed successfully in a normative defense of feasi-
bility regulation, requires elaboration of a kind that Driesen has
not offered. This is my primary motivation for relying on contrac-
tualist moral theory as a sensible specification of what equity re-
quires in particular circumstances. Further, the particular vari-
ant of contractualism I rely on-ex ante contractualism-provides
a useful framework for determining what equity requires in cir-
cumstances where the act or policy under consideration involves
imposing risks of death, illness, or job loss. My goal in this article
is to provide a theoretically robust and more elaborate version of
the sort of equity-based justification that Driesen seems to have
in mind with his concentration principle, thereby providing a de-
fense of feasibility regulation that is less vulnerable to the objec-
tions that have been lodged by advocates of CBA.
B. Rawlsian Social Contract Theory: Keating
Gregory Keating correctly locates the normative basis of the
feasibility principle in social contract theory, rather than in wel-
farism.73 For this reason, Keating's work is foundational for the
argument in this article and indeed for any attempt to defend
feasibility regulation on the basis of social contract theory.74 How-
ever, there is a significant lacuna in Keating's account that leaves
it susceptible to one of the chief objections lodged by advocates of
CBA.
Keating's case for the feasibility regulation rests on "a particu-
lar conception of fairness," one that emerges from "the social con-
73. See Gregory C. Keating, Irreparable Injury and Extraordinary Precaution: The
Safety and Feasibility Norms in American Accident Law, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1,
22, 25-26 (2003); Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 681, 684-85; Gregory C.
Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calbresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 159, 180-81,
183-84 (2005); Keating, Social Contract, supra note 11, at 46-51.
74. Interestingly, Masur and Posner appear to have overlooked Keating's work in
their discussion of the normative basis of feasibility regulation. See Masur & Posner, su-
pra note 8, at 699-709 (failing to discuss or mention Keating's work in their discussion of
the normative basis of the feasibility approach).
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tract tradition in political philosophy, broadly conceived."5 For
Keating, the fundamental question accident law poses is how to
reconcile potential injurers' interest in liberty with potential vic-
tims' interest in bodily security."8 The social contract conception
of fairness on which Keating relies holds that "[flair terms recon-
cile the competing claims of liberty and security in ways that ad-
vantage even those they most disadvantage.' 7  Keating observes,
It is reasonable to expose other people to risks of serious injury and
even death when it is fair to do so; and it is fair to do so when they
also stand to gain, ex ante and over time, from the imposition of
[those] risks .... 78
Keating considers two types of risk impositions. The first in-
volves what he calls a "community of risk." This is a case in which
(i) those exposed to the risk at issue also benefit from being able
to impose the identical risk on others and (ii) all persons affected
by the risky practice face roughly the same level of risk and de-
rive roughly the same level of benefit from being able to impose
that risk on others.79 The paradigmatic example of a community
of risk is the activity of driving automobiles on shared public
roads. Keating asserts, "The right to impose risks on others can
justify the imposition of equal risks on us by others, because, for
example, we may each gain more than we lose from having to
bear the risks created by the presence of other cars on the road."8
When a community of risk is present,
practices of risk imposition are fair if and when they are to the ad-
vantage of a representative member of the community. They are to
the advantage of a representative member of the community when
the liberty that she gains from the right to impose the relevant risks
is more valuable to her than the security she loses from having to
bear exposure to equivalent risk impositions at the hands of others."'
75. Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 674.
76. See id. at 675-78.
77. Id. at 677. Keating refers to this as a "general Rawlsian idea of fairness." Id. at
679 n.61; see also id. at 676 n.57 (observing that his "conception of the problem of acci-
dental harm has its roots in the social contract tradition in political theory, especially as
articulated by John Rawls"). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (of-
fering a theory of distributive justice based on social contract principles).
78. Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 678.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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From a social contract standpoint, the practice of driving on
shared roads is fair because the practice is to the ex ante ad-
vantage of those exposed to its risks. That is, we each stand to
gain more from the practice of driving on shared roads than we
stand to lose. Crucially, this can be true from an ex ante perspec-
tive even though those unlucky enough to be injured or killed in
car accidents may, from an ex post perspective, ultimately have
lost more from the practice than they have gained.
The second type of risk imposition Keating considers does not
involve a community of risk. In this sort of risk imposition, some
asymmetry is present, typically one involving the imposition of
the activity's risks on a particular subset of the activity's benefi-
ciaries, rather than on all of the activity's beneficiaries.82 The
paradigmatic example would be a health risk borne by workers in
a particular industry-say, due to a toxic substance used in the
industry's production processes. Although the industry may con-
fer significant benefits on its consumers, workers, and sharehold-
ers, the industry's health risks are borne solely--or at least dis-
proportionately-by the workers. Because of this asymmetry
between the class of the industry's beneficiaries and the class of
those exposed to its health risks, a community of risk would not
be present.
In such a situation, Keating describes the requirements of fair-
ness as follows:
When risks are not imposed within a community of risk-when a
discernible group bears more of the burden or garners less of the
benefit of some practice of risk imposition-practices of risk imposi-
tion are fair when they work to the greatest long-run advantage of a
representative member of the class of those most disadvantaged by
the practice of risk imposition.'
In the case of a practice which puts some in particular peril, we can
say that there was no reconciliation of these two essential conditions
of rational agency [liberty and security] that would have improved
the prospects of those most disadvantaged by the reconciliation at
issue, without imposing a greater disadvantage on a comparable
84
class of those affected by the practice.
82. See id. at 679-80.
83. Id. at 679.
84. Id. at 680 (emphasis added); see also id. ('There was no alternate way of reconcil-
1280 [Vol. 50:1263
EQUITY AND FEASIBILITY REGULATION
Although Keating does not say so explicitly, the so-called "maxi-
min" criterion is plainly at work here.5 The maximin criterion
ranks alternative policies or actions according to the situation of
the worst off group or individual.6 Under maximin, the right poli-
cy or course of action is that under which the situation of the
worst-off group or individual is better than it is under any alter-
native policy or course of action.87 For Keating, when a communi-
ty of risk is not present, a fair practice of risk imposition is one
that, among a set of alternative practices, maximizes the position
of those most disadvantaged by the practice, the practice that
maximizes the minimum.8" To return to the example of a work-
place health risk, the practice of imposing such risk would satisfy
the maximin criterion if the risk were regulated in such a way
that the risk-bearing workers could not be made safer without
imposing a greater burden on another class of persons.
For Keating, the case for feasibility regulation involves the se-
cond type of risk imposition he considers, one not involving a
community of risk.88 This makes sense because the health risks
posed by industrial activity tend to be asymmetric in that they
usually fall on a subset of the activity's beneficiaries-e.g., work-
ers or residents of communities' neighboring plants-rather than
on all of the activity's beneficiaries.
The requirement that such risks be reduced to the feasibility
point emerges straightforwardly from an application of the max-
imin criterion. Because the monetary costs of risk reduction are
generally dispersed among a large number of consumers or
shareholders, significant reductions in each risk-bearer's chance
ing liberty and security which would have improved their life prospects, and perhaps have
avoided their devastation, without working a greater hardship on another class of per-
sons.").
85. This is evident, in particular, in the clause that is italicized in the foregoing quo-
tation. The maximin criterion figures prominently in the work of John Rawls, on which
Keating's own social contract conception of airness is based. See RAWLS, supra note 77, at
133-38 (discussing maximin criterion).
86. See id. at 133.
87. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 490 (1984) ("According to Maximin, the
best outcome is the one in which the worst-off people are best off."); RAWLS, supra note 77,
at 33 (' The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we
are to adopt the alternative the worst outcomes of which is superior to the worst outcomes
of the others.").
88. See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 680.
89. Id. at 679.
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of suffering death or serious injury can be achieved at a cost that,
while perhaps significant in total, is trivial for each consumer or
shareholder who will absorb the cost.9" So long as the increases in
the safety of each risk-bearer can be achieved at a minimal mone-
tary cost to each cost-bearer, the maximin criterion requires that
regulation continue, even if this results in more stringent regula-
tion than CBA would have.91 In such circumstances, the position
of those most disadvantaged by the risky activity-the workers or
plant neighbors whose life and limb it imperils-is being im-
proved without imposing a comparably severe burden on those
consumers or shareholders who must bear the cost of the im-
92provement.
However, there will come a point at which further reduction in
each risk-bearer's risk of death or serious bodily harm can be
achieved only by imposing costs that would threaten the exist-
ence of the risky activity itself. For Keating, it is at this point-
the feasibility point-that fairness forbids further risk reduc-
tion.93 If the activity is an important one, then its cessation would
necessarily deprive its would-be beneficiaries of important life-
improving (and perhaps life-preserving) benefits. Further, the
burden imposed by such a deprivation might well be worse than
the burden imposed on those risk-bearing workers or neighbors
whose life and limb the activity imperils.94 If that is the case, the
maximin criterion requires regulation up to the feasibility point,
but no further. This line of reasoning represents the core of Keat-
ing's social contract case for feasibility regulation.
90. See id. at 698 ("It is unfair to inflict even one death for the sake of trivial gains to
others, no matter how numerous those others may be, and it is equally unfair to devastate
even one person so that many people may reap trivial benefits.").
91. See id. at 674 ("When pressing precaution beyond the point of cost-justification
confers great benefits on some at the cost of only trivial losses to others, doing so is not
only fair, it is also desirable insofar as well-being itself is of primary concern.").
92. See id. at 702 ("[W]hen trivial gains to a large number of persons stand on the
credit side of the balance sheet and devastating harms to a few stand on the debit side, the
imposition of the risks in question should be forbidden. No number of trivial gains to some
can ever compare to a single devastating injury to another.").
93. See id. at 684-85.
94. See id. at 722 ('The judgment of comparability at work here is a simple one: The
risky activity being regulated is sufficiently valuable that shutting the activity down
would work a greater hardship to those who benefit from it than would asking those
workers endangered by the activity to bear significant risks of devastating injury.").
1282 [Vol. 50:1263
EQUITY AND FEASIBILITY REGULATION
There is, however, a significant lacuna in Keating's account
that leaves it still vulnerable to objection. Keating does not pro-
vide an entirely satisfying response to the criticism that the fea-
sibility approach is capable of overregulation. If Keating is correct
that only the cessation of a major productive activity is a harm
comparable to the imposition of a significant risk of death or dev-
astating injury,95 then any reduction in such a risk-no matter
how tiny-would seem to be required no matter how great the
monetary cost, so long as the imposition of the cost does not
threaten the existence of the underlying industry. The implicit
suggestion is that one individual's certain monetary loss (or gain)
is fundamentally incomparable to-and cannot fairly be traded
against-an increase (or reduction) in the low but significant risk
of death or serious bodily harm borne by another individual. In
an important sense, this leaves Keating's account unresponsive to
Masur and Posner's overregulation objection. "Overregulation oc-
curs," according to Masur and Posner, "because feasibility analy-
sis ignores the cost of regulations to consumers-the costs they
incur because prices rise or products disappear from the mar-
ket." By suggesting that the burden imposed by an increase in
per-unit prices is categorically incomparable to the burden im-
posed by an increased risk of death or devastating injury (no mat-
ter how slight the increase in risk), Keating's account seems to
give inadequate weight to the monetary burden that regulation
places on consumers.
The discussion in Part IV will make clear a disagreement with
Keating's view that monetary losses and reductions in risks of
death or serious injury are fundamentally incomparable. Incre-
mental changes in the monetary costs borne by each individual
who subsidizes safety precaution can meaningfully be traded
against incremental changes in the risks of serious bodily harm
borne by each individual risk-bearer. If a given reduction in risk
is sufficiently costly for each cost-bearer and sufficiently small for
each risk-bearer, it is inequitable to require the reduction, even if
95. See Keating, Social Contract, supra note 11, at 46 ("Only the cessation of an activ-
ity threatens to impair anyone's pursuit of a conception of the good as gravely as prema-
ture death and permanent disability do, and then only if the activity is an important and
hard to replace one.").
96. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 704; see also id. at 702 ("A regulation that re-
duces risks of harm very little, while imposing very high costs on consumers, should not be
issued even if it does not close any plants.").
20161 1283
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
doing so would not threaten the survival of the underlying activi-
ty. This article therefore departs from Keating's stated view in
conceding that feasibility-based regulation would not be justified
in circumstances where the marginal cost to each cost-bearer
would exceed the amount each risk-bearer would rationally be
willing to pay for the resulting marginal reduction in his or her
own risk.97 To adequately justify feasibility as a floor for regula-
tion, an empirical corollary is needed: that, in the common regu-
latory scenario involving health risks posed by toxic substances
used in or emitted by industrial activity, such circumstances will
rarely occur.9"
III. EQUITY AND CONTRACTUALISM
This part describes the notions of equity, contractualism, and
normative pluralism. These are the normative principles upon
which this article's defense of feasibility-based regulation rests.
A. Contractualism as an Interpretation of Equity
The term "equity" is defined in Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary as "a free and reasonable conformity to accepted
standards of natural right, law, and justice without prejudice, fa-
voritism, or fraud and without rigor entailing undue hardship."99
Although often taken to be synonymous with fairness,°° equity,
as its etymology suggests,1°' specifically connotes the aspect of
fairness that has to do with equality. "[T]he essence of Justice or
Equity," observed the utilitarian moral philosopher Henry Sidg-
wick, "is that different individuals are not to be treated different-
ly, except on grounds of universal application."'0 2 Equity is there-
fore a somewhat narrower concept than fairness, as it is
97. See generally infra Part IV.A.
98. See infra at Part IV.A.3-4.
99. Equity, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2002). This
article will use the term in this more popular sense, rather than in the technical legal
sense that refers to the legal system and body of principles originating in the English
Court of Chancery.
100. See Equity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining equity as
"[flairness; impartiality; evenhanded ealing").
101. The term derives from the Latin words aequitas ("equality") and aequus ("equal").
Equity, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2002).
102. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 496 (1981).
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specifically concerned with achieving fairness in the distribution
of burdens and benefits."3 It is for this reason that equity-rather
than the broader notion of fairness-is the concept that best cap-
tures the gist of this article's defense of feasibility regulation. Eq-
uity, as understood here, is broadly concerned with equalizing the
burdens borne by differently situated individuals as the result of
some socially desirable act, practice, or policy. As discussed in
Part IV, underlying feasibility regulation is precisely the concern
for achieving parity among the respective burdens borne by the
risk-bearers, cost-bearers, and potential beneficiaries of a risky
industrial activity.
Like the norm of fairness, the norm of equity presupposes
evaluation of an action or policy from the point of view of each af-
fected individual, rather than an impersonal evaluation from a
"view from nowhere" or "God's eye" perspective.' When deter-
mining whether an action or policy is equitable, one is implicitly
and necessarily asking whether it is equitable to a particular af-
fected party or to each and every affected party.' It is impossible
to determine whether an action, policy, or rule is equitable in a
general sense without assessing and comparing its impact on
each affected individual. By contrast, norms like overall well-
being or efficiency do not require that the perspective of each af-
fected individual be consulted and considered.'6 It would not
make sense, for example, to ask whether an action or policy max-
imizes social welfare to or from the standpoint of a particular par-
ty.
103. By contrast, one can intelligibly speak of fairness in a non-distributive sense. For
example, consider the notions of "fair play," see Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) (observing that an assertion of personal jurisdiction must not offend "tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice") (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)), and "unfair surprise," see 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 18:7 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing notion of "unfair surprise" in the context of
the unconscionability doctrine in contract law).
104. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 72, at 95 ("[Flairness is concerned only with how well
each person's claim is satisfied compared with how well other people's are satisfied. It is
concerned only with relative satisfaction, not absolute satisfaction.").
105. This is reflected in the famous definition of justice offered by the Roman jurist Ul-
pian: "Justice is a steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right." Dig. 1.1.10
(Ulpian, Rules 1) (Alan Watson ed., 1985).
106. See Johann Frick, Contractualism and Social Risk, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 221
(2015) ("[E]quity is an 'individualistic' moral notion. Being equitable is a property that at-
taches to actions, not in virtue of their overall or aggregate effects, but in virtue of how
they treat each person individually.").
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However, what exactly equity requires in a particular case may
not be deducible from these rather abstract observations. For
purposes of analysis, this article adopts a particular interpreta-
tion of the notion of equity. Specifically, this article will hold an
action, practice, policy, or rule to be equitable if and only if it
would be permitted by contractualism.10 7 Contractualism is a rel-
atively new theory of normative ethics, introduced by the philos-
opher T.M. Scanlon in 1982,08 and founded on the social contract
tradition in political philosophy (embodied in the work of Locke, °9
Rousseau,110 and Rawls"') and on the Kantian tradition in moral
philosophy."
2
Contractualism is not a general theory of morality, but rather a
theory of interpersonal morality or, to use Scanlon's famous
phrase, "what we owe to each other.""' From its inception, con-
tractualism has purported to represent an alternative to utilitar-
ianism and, in particular, to embody an argument against the
core utilitarian tenet that all moral questions reduce to questions
about the consequences of acts (or rules) for the aggregate well-
being of all affected individuals."4
Contractualism offers the following criterion for determining
the rightness or wrongness of an action: "[A]n act is wrong if its
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any
set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general
agreement."5
107. See id. at 220-21 (arguing that the notion of equity best captures the wrong-
making property that contractualism specifies).
108. See generally T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (1982) [hereinafter Scanlon, Contractualism]; T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998) (especially Chapter 5, pp. 189-247)
[hereinafter SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE].
109. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Pub'g Co. 1980) (1690).
110. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS 153-252 (1778) (Donald A. Cress ed., trans., 2d ed., 2011).
111. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
112. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 1-5 (Mary
Gregor ed., trans., 1997).
113. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 108, at 7, 110. Thus, contractualism does
not directly address questions of political morality, the moral strictures applicable to the
actions and policies of coercive institutions, nor does it address our moral obligations to
animals or future persons.
114. Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 108 at 120.
115. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 108, at 153.
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What exactly does that mean? And in what sense is this formu-
la supposed to represent an alternative to utilitarianism? Consid-
er the following example.
Policy Choice
Suppose the government is deciding between two different poli-
cies with which to accomplish a particular goal, Policy One and
Policy Two. Both policies will affect Group A, composed of one
million people, and Group B, composed of 100 people. At the time
of the government's decision, all members of both groups enjoy
roughly equal levels of well-being, and a decent, intermediate
standard of living. Policy One would leave members of Group A
much better off by increasing their standard of living from decent
to high, but would leave members of Group B much worse off by
lowering their standard of living from decent to low. Policy Two
would leave members of Group A slightly better off by making a
very small improvement in their standard of living, but would
leave members of Group B slightly worse off by making a very
small reduction in their standard of living. From a normative
point of view, which policy should the government adopt?
A view referred to as welfarism provides a normative basis for
choosing Policy One. Welfarism, as the term is understood in this
article, is the view that the morally right action or policy is that
which maximizes social welfare, that action or policy under which
the aggregate (overall) well-being of all affected persons is great-
er than it would be under any alternative action or policy.116 In
the above example, welfarism would direct the government to
calculate the net aggregate gain (or loss) in welfare associated
with each policy, and to choose the policy that delivers the great-
er net gain (or smaller net loss) to aggregate welfare. It seems
clear that both policies would increase aggregate welfare on net.
This follows from the fact that, while each policy would result in
a reduction in the well-being of 100 people (Group B), each policy
116. Welfarism, as is understood here, is essentially equivalent to classical utilitarian-
ism, except that it holds the goodness of the outcome of an action or policy is to be evalu-
ated on the basis of how it affects the well-being of individuals, rather than on how much
pleasure or pain it produces. See Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/#toc ("When a welfarist theory of value
is combined with the other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be
called welfarist consequentialism.").
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would also deliver an equally sized increase to the well-being of
one million people (Group A). For this reason, both policies would,
from a welfarist point of view, plausibly result in a net improve-
ment over the status quo."' For a welfarist, the question is which
policy delivers the bigger improvement, i.e., the greater increase
to overall well-being. On that question, it seems clear that Policy
One wins out. While Policy One would make each Group A mem-
ber much better off, Policy Two would make each Group A mem-
ber only slightly better off. Were Group A the only group of people
affected, it is clear Policy One would result in a significantly
greater increase in aggregate well-being than Policy Two would.
Does this change when the policies' respective effects on Group B
are taken into consideration? Almost certainly not. Although Pol-
icy One would leave members of Group B worse off than Policy
Two would, Group B is only a tiny fraction (1/10,000) of the size of
Group A. The policies' respective effects on 100-person Group B
therefore play a negligible role in determining how they would
each affect the aggregate well-being of all 1,000,100 affected per-
sons. For these reasons, it is assumed Policy One would deliver a
greater net increase to aggregate well-being than Policy Two
would. Welfarism therefore favors Policy One.
Contractualism provides a normative basis for choosing Policy
Two. Contractualists believe the normatively appropriate policy
is the one that could be justified not to the entire group of affect-
ed persons considered as a whole, but to each affected person in
light of how the policy, and the available alternatives, would af-
fect him or her.'18 To use contractualist language, the morally
permissible policy is the one permitted by a principle that no per-
son could reasonably reject.'19 Policy One is not justifiable to
members of Group B because there is an alternative policy-
Policy Two-under which no person is left as bad off as members
of Group B would be under Policy One. A contractualist would
maintain that members of Group B could, on that basis, reasona-
bly reject a principle permitting Policy One, making Policy One
117. In welfare economics terms: although neither policy would represent a "Pareto"
improvement over the status quo, both policies would result in a "Kaldor-Hicks" improve-
ment. See NICHOLAS BARR, ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 46 (5th ed. 2002) (defining
"Pareto" efficiency); Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, OXFORD DICTIONARY Bus. & MGMT. 344 (6th
ed. 2016).
118. See SCALON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 108, at 229.
119. See id. at 153.
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morally impermissible. Members of Group A might wish to reject
Policy Two in favor of Policy One, but they could not reasonably
do so, as they would implicitly be asking each member of Group B
to put up with being left substantially worse off (rather than only
slightly worse off) so that each member of Group A could avoid
being left only slightly better off (rather than substantially better
off).
The contractualist criterion of moral rightness involves three
core ideas: (i) that interpersonal morality presupposes the re-
quirement of justifiability to each affected person considered as
an individual, rather than the requirement of justifiability to all
affected persons considered in the aggregate;'2 ° (ii) that the moral
status of a particular act (its rightness or wrongness) is a func-
tion of the moral validity of the general principle licensing the
act;2' and (iii) tying together the first two tenets, that a principle
is justifiable to each person if and only if it would command the
free assent of all persons, i.e., no person could reasonably reject it
as a principle for the general regulation of behavior."' Thus, un-
der contractualism, an act is morally right if and only if no one
could reasonably reject the general principle permitting the act.
When, according to contractualism, can a principle be reasona-
bly rejected? The concept underlying the notion of reasonable re-
jectability is the minimax criterion.'23 Among a set of candidate
principles, the nonrejectable principle, P, is the one of which the
following is true: the strongest complaint any person could make
against P, were P generally accepted, is weaker than the strong-
est complaint that could be made against every other alternative
principle. As Scanlon puts it, "[S]omeone can reasonably reject a
principle if there is some alternative to which no other person has
a complaint that is as strong."'2 4 The principle no one could rea-
120. Id. at 153, 390 n.8 ("What is basic to contractualism as I understand it is the idea
of justifiability to each person (on grounds that he or she could not reasonably reject).").
121. Id. at 197 ('To justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting it and to
claim that they are sufficient to defeat any objections that others may have. To do this,
however, is also to defend a principle, namely one claiming that such reasons are suffi-
cient grounds for so acting under the prevailing conditions.").
122. Id. at 153.
123. This article follows Sophia Reibetanz in using the minimax criterion to explain
the notion of reasonable rejectability. See Sophia Reibetanz, Contractualism and Aggrega-
tion, 108 ETHIcS 296, 300 (1998) (describing "minimax complaint model" of reasonably re-
jectability).
124. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 108, at 229.
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sonably reject is the principle that, among a set of candidate
principles, minimizes the strength of the complaint that could be
lodged by the maximally burdened person.125 The person who
would be most burdened by the general acceptance of a particular
principle still cannot reasonably reject that principle if every al-
ternative principle would, if generally accepted, impose a greater
burden on someone else.
Contractualism thus contemplates a rejectability inquiry, the
goal of which is to identify the principle or policy satisfying the
minimax criterion. This is a fundamentally comparative inquiry
that takes into account not just the extent to which general ac-
ceptance of each candidate principle burdens each affected person
in an absolute sense, but also the differential each person experi-
ences in the burdens they would bear under the respective prin-
ciples.2 s That is, supposing A is the most burdened party under
Principle P-1 and B the most burdened party under Principle P-2,
we ask not only if A's burden under Principle P-1 is weightier
than B's burden under Principle P-2, but also if A's gain in mov-
ing from P-1 to P-2 is more significant than B's gain in moving
from P-2 to P-1. In other words, would it be unreasonable for A to
refuse to accept the loss she would experience in moving from P-2
to P-1 in order for B to avoid the loss she would experience in
moving from P-1 to P-2?1
21
A critically important feature of contractualism-one that
makes it particularly appropriate as an interpretation of the no-
tion of equity-is what has been termed its individualist re-
striction, i.e., "its insistence that the justifiability of a moral prin-
ciple depends only on various individuals' reasons for objecting to
that principle and alternatives to it. ' 121 In other words, according
125. Applying the minimax rule to complaints or burdens is roughly (though not per-
fectly) equivalent to applying the more familiar "maximin" rule to outcomes for individual
well-being. See Reibetanz, supra note 123, at 299.
126. See id.; Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 108, at 113.
127. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 108, at 123. For example, suppose that
under P-i, A's well-being is 102 and B's is 103 and under P-2, A's well-being is 150 and B's
is 101. The mere fact that the loser under P-1 (A) is slightly better off than the loser under
P-2 (B) does not necessarily mean that P-1 is the nonrejectable principle satisfying the
minimax criterion. This is because A might plausibly be taken to have a stronger com-
plaint with P-1 being chosen over P-2 than B would have with P-2 being chosen over P-1.
Why? Because it would arguably be unreasonable for B to refuse to accept a 2-unit (rough-
ly 2%) reduction in well-being so that A can avoid a 48-unit (roughly 32%) reduction in
well-being. Thus, B could not reasonably reject P-2.
128. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 108, at 229 (emphasis in original).
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to the individualist restriction, the strength of a complaint lodged
against a particular principle can never be a function of the sum
of different individuals' gain (or loss) in well-being as compared
with some alternative principle. Thus, contractualism does not
allow for the interpersonal aggregation of complaints. It instead
contemplates "a series of pairwise comparisons' 121 in which one
representative individual's burden under a particular principle is
compared to another representative individual's burden under an
alternative principle. To return to the example discussed above,
the fact that there are many more people in Group A than in
Group B plays no role in determining which policy is justifiable to
each person. That determination is made entirely on the basis of
a pairwise comparison between representative members of each
group.
B. Contractualism and Risk: Ex Ante or Ex Post?
In cases involving the imposition of a risk of harm, as opposed
to the imposition of certain harm, contractualism requires a fur-
ther specification. Are the possible principles, policies, or courses
of action to be evaluated on the basis of the risks of harm they
pose to each person they might impact, or on the basis of the ac-
tual harm they cause to the person or persons they do impact?
Under ex ante contractualism, candidate principles are evalu-
ated based on risk, i.e., on their expected outcomes for the well-
being of each individual who stands a chance of being affected
(positively or negatively) by the principles' respective adoption.1 °
This means the rejectability inquiry would be based on probabil-
istic data about each individual's expected fate under each prin-
ciple-the likelihood of suffering death, serious injury, or some
other loss from the risks the principle tolerates. Thus, under ex
ante contractualism, in determining the magnitude of the bur-
dens that a given policy would impose on differently-situated in-
dividuals, it is the policy's probabilistically defined expected im-
pact on each affected individual's well-being that is relevant (e.g.,
129. See Reibetanz, supra note 123, at 300.
130. See Aaron James, Contractualism's (Not So) Slippery Slope, 18 LEGAL THEORY
263, 266-67 (2012) ("Let us call ex ante contractualism the ... view that only expected out-
comes count as grounds for complaint or objection (including expected outcomes of a prin-
ciple's general adoption) mounted on behalf of each potentially affected party from some
specified epistemic position.").
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the risk of death or devastating injury borne by each and every
worker in a particular industry), rather than the policy's actual
outcomes for individuals' well-being (e.g., the death or devastat-
ing injury expected to be suffered by an unlucky subset of the
workers in that industry)."'
Under ex post contractualism, on the other hand, candidate
principles are evaluated based on their outcomes for the well-
being of each individual who is actually affected by adoption of
the principle at issue.'32 This means the rejectability inquiry
would be based on data concerning the actual fate that some ex
ante unidentifiable individual is expected to suffer under each
principle, such as death, serious injury, or some other type of loss.
For example, suppose a government policy imposes a one-in
one million risk of death on a group of one million individuals.
Under ex ante contractualism, each of the million risk-bearers
would have a complaint valued at one millionth of the strength of
a complaint based on death. Under ex post contractualism, on the
other hand, where the principle is expected to result in exactly
one death, each of the million risk-bearers would have a com-
plaint based on death.
The idea underlying ex ante contractualism is that there is a
moral difference between, for example, imposing a one-in-one mil-
lion risk of death on one million people and a 50% risk of death on
two people, even though both impositions will have the identical
expected outcome: one death. According to ex ante contractual-
ism, each of the one million risk-bearers has a weaker complaint
against imposition of the risk they are subject to than do each of
the two persons subject to the 50% risk, notwithstanding that
both risk impositions are expected to result in the death of a sin-
gle person. Ex post contractualism, however, considers the two
situations to be morally identical.
131. See Frick, supra note 106, at 118 ("According to ex ante contractualism, the
strength of someone's personal reasons for rejecting a principle licensing a risky action
depends on the quality of the prospect that the action gave her ex ante. A person's harm-
based complaint against a loss she suffers must, therefore, be discounted by her ex ante
unlikelihood of suffering a loss and by her ex ante likelihood of benefiting from the risky
action.").
132. See id. at 185 (describing ex post contractualism as the view that "the relative
strength of an individual's harm-based complaint turns not on the ex ante prospect it of-
fered her individually, but on the foreseeable distribution of outcomes across individuals
that the action will produce ex post."); James, supra note 130, at 266 ('let us call ex post
contractualism the view that we should evaluate what decision is reasonably acceptable
only in light of its actual outcomes as they actually unfold over time.").
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Ex ante contractualism is the more defensible form of contrac-
tualism because it seems clear that the magnitude of the risk
faced by each risk-bearer is a factor relevant to moral judgments
in cases of risk imposition. To begin, compare the effect that
awareness of the risk imposition would have on risk-bearers in
the two-person case with the effect it would have in the million-
person case. Knowing that one is going to be exposed to a 50%
risk of death would strike terror in most people; knowing that one
is going to be exposed to a one in one million risk of death would
not. Consider, for example, that the lifetime risk of being killed in
a lightning strike in the United States is roughly 1 in 164,968.'
The imposition of risk can, in and of itself, have a negative impact
on the well-being of those exposed, provided they are aware of the
imposition and know something about its magnitude and proba-
bility. And even if the person exposed to a 50% risk of death were
not aware of the imposition at the time it occurred, she would
still plausibly have a strong moral objection to the imposition
based purely on the fact that it dramatically raised the likelihood
she would be killed.
13 4
Another way of getting at the same idea is to imagine what
each of the two risk-bearers would plausibly be willing to sacrifice
to eliminate the 50% risk of death to which they are subject (All
their wealth? A limb? Two limbs?). Now compare that with the
sacrifice each of the million risk-bearers would plausibly be will-
ing to make to eliminate the .0001% risk of death to which they
are subject. This is probably very little, if anything at all.
In both cases, one person is expected to die. In the two-person
case, however, two people will also be placed at significant risk of
death. In the million person case, no one-not even the unlucky
person killed when the risk materializes-is placed at significant
risk of death. To the extent risk imposition alone can negatively
impact the well-being of a risk-bearer aware of the imposition
and can ground a moral objection to the imposition even in a case
where the risk-bearer is ignorant of the risk at the time it is im-
133. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 43 (2015), http://www.nsc.orgMe
mbership%20Site%20Document%20Library/2015%20Injury%2OFactsJNSCInjuryFacts2O
15Ed.pdf.
134. See Aaron James, The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk 17 (unpublished
manuscript), https://webfiles.uci.edu/ajjames/Distinctive%20Significance%20ofo/2OSystem
ic%20Risk.docx (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) ("The interest we have in our exposure to risk
is an objective interest in its own right, which is not to be confused with or reduced to our
separate interests in not suffering the experience of risk exposure.").
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posed, the two-person imposition seems morally worse. Ex ante
contractualism registers this difference. Ex post contractualism
effaces it.
In a 2001 essay, Judge Richard Posner implicitly recognized
this point in the context of discussing the notion of placing a
monetary value on a statistical human life. Posner discussed two
hypothetical projects, the first imposing a one-in-one million risk
of death on one million people and the second imposing a one in
1000 risk of death on 1000 people.35 Posner observed,
The cost [of the projects] is the same in an ex post sense, but evalu-
ating the projects ex ante requires consideration of the ex ante costs,
and they are not the same. The second project is more costly ex ante,
because people are much more reluctant (plausibly more than a
thousand times as reluctant) to be subjected to the higher risk. If the
1 million would pay less in the aggregate to avert the risk to them
than the 1 thousand would pay to avert the respective risk to them,
the second project is more costly.
13
6
Posner's point that cost-benefit analysis ought to register differ-
ences in the level of individual risk faced by each risk-bearer,
even when there are no differences in the ultimate outcome ex
post, provides support for the analogous proposition that our
moral judgments ought to register such differences as well, par-
ticularly when trying to determine how much money ought to be
invested in risk-reducing precautions."' This militates in favor of
contractualism taking an ex ante, rather than ex post, form.
A final reason for preferring ex ante contractualism relates to
cases of the sort considered in this article: ones where activities
providing substantial social benefits also pose significant risks of
death or serious injury. If possible regulatory standards are eval-
uated from an ex post point of view, contractualism would im-
plausibly deem impermissible most forms of socially beneficial,
though significantly risky, conduct. If a precautionary standard
tolerates a risk that is expected to result in the death of even a
single person, that standard could, it seems, be reasonably reject-
135. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment
on Conference Papers, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 324 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
136. Id. at 324-25.
137. But see Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of
Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (2005) (arguing individual risk, as opposed
to population risk, is irrelevant from a normative point of view).
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ed, since no person will have a stronger complaint than one based
on the loss of life."3 8 As the philosopher Aaron James has put it,
"Complaints of death will always carry the day."'139 Thus, if the ex
post point of view governs, any risky activity that would be ex-
pected to result in the death of at least one person will be imper-
missible according to contractualism, since there will be at least
one person who could reasonably reject the principle that allows
the activity to go forward. But this would bar all sorts of risky ac-
tivities-large-scale construction projects, etc.-that, assuming
reasonable precautions are taken, seem intuitively acceptable,
notwithstanding that they are certain to result in the accidental
loss of life and limb.
140
Thus, because ex post contractualism ignores factors that seem
morally relevant and leads to results that seem morally implau-
sible, contractualism should take an ex ante form when applied to
cases involving the imposition of risks of harm.1
4
1
C. Normative Pluralism
Hard-core contractualists would insist that contractualist con-
siderations exhaust the content of morality, and that morality
always requires choosing the act or policy that is most equitable.
Hard-core welfarists, on the other hand, would insist that consid-
erations of overall well-being exhaust the content of morality,
that morality always requires choosing the act or policy that max-
imizes overall well-being. Thus, in the Policy Choice hypothetical
discussed above, a hard-core welfarist would maintain that the
138. See Barbara H. Fried, Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?, 16 J.
ETHICS 39, 440 (2012) (noting that under ex post contractualism, "any principle that au-
thorizes actions that risk gravely harming at least one person will be rejected by the hypo-
thetical representative person who, by happenstance or by being permitted to peek ahead,
learns she will be the unlucky one").
139. James, supra note 130, at 272.
140. See Frick, supra note 106, at 185 (arguing that "ex post contractualism is hard to
accept" because it "would dramatically contradict many of our ordinary moral convictions"
about the permissibility of risky activities); James, supra note 130, at 269 (arguing that ex
post contractualism results in "moral gridlock," i.e., a ban on virtually all socially benefi-
cial but risky activities).
141. A number of commentators have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Frick, su-
pra note 106, at 180, 219; James, supra note 130, at 274, 292; Rahul Kumar, Risking and
Wronging, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 48 (2015). Ex ante contractualism is not without its
critics, however, and may face certain problems of its own. See Reibetanz, supra note 123,
at 302-04, 311 (arguing that ex ante contractualism can lead to counterintuitive results).
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government should opt for Policy One, notwithstanding its argu-
ably inequitable impact on members of Group B.
Normative pluralists reject both hard-core welfarism and hard-
core contractualism. Pluralists believe that normative judgments
should be informed both by considerations of equity and by con-
siderations of overall well-being (and perhaps by other sorts as
well), making room for the possibility that welfarism should pre-
vail in some situations and contractualism in others.
142
For example, a pluralist might hold that contractualist consid-
erations should prevail over welfarist considerations when an act
or policy will deliver tiny benefits to a vast number of people, but
inflict devastating losses on a very small number of people. Such
a policy could be rejected on contractualist grounds notwithstand-
ing that it might increase aggregate well-being significantly on
net. On the other hand, a pluralist might hold that welfarist con-
siderations should prevail over contractualist considerations
when, for example, choosing between a policy that poses a 1 in
1000 risk of death to one million people (1000 expected deaths)
and a policy that poses a one in ten risk of death to 100 people
(ten expected deaths). The latter policy could be justified on wel-
farist grounds notwithstanding that it runs afoul of ex ante con-
tractualism's minimax criterion, i.e., it imposes a far greater ex-
pected burden on each of the 100 persons it would affect than the
alternative policy would impose on each of the one million per-
sons it would affect.
When contractualist and welfarist considerations conflict, a
normative pluralist would reach a considered judgment about the
morally correct course of action by gauging the strength of those
competing considerations. If, for example, contractualist consid-
erations weigh strongly in favor of a particular course of action
and welfarist considerations weigh only weakly against it, the
normative pluralist could sensibly hold the course of action to be
142. I owe to Johann Frick the notion of a normative pluralism specifically encompass-
ing considerations of both equity and overall well-being. See Frick, supra note 106, at 219,
221-22 (proposing a "pluralist account of moral rightness" that embraces considerations of
both equity and well-being); cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 9, at 275 ('Thus we disagree
with classical utilitarianism, which is the view that overall well-being is the sole criterion
bearing on governmental choice. Our view is that the government should choose a welfare-
improving project unless other considerations, such as deontological or egalitarian consid-
erations, justify rejecting the welfare-improving project and choosing the status quo in-
stead.").
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morally permissible. The more difficult cases are those in which
the conflicting normative considerations are of relatively equal
strength.
As a normative pluralist, it is tempting to look for a decision
rule or algorithm with which to resolve such cases. That tempta-
tion should be resisted. The task of moral theory is to identify the
relevant normative factors that should inform our moral judg-
ments and to explain why those factors matter,'43 not to provide a
quasi-mathematical rule for making all moral judgments. Moral
judgment in particular cases is inherently multifactorial and
deeply fact-dependent, making a rigid algorithm an inappropriate
substitute for considered reflection and deliberation when the
normative factors one has identified stand in equipoise.14
A normative pluralism embracing both welfarism and contrac-
tualism constitutes the theoretical foundation of the argument in
this article. However, contractualist considerations receive great-
er emphasis in the analysis because, as will be demonstrated in
the following Part, they do the lion's share of work in providing a
normative basis for feasibility-based regulation.
IV. A CONTRACTUALIST DEFENSE OF FEASIBILITY-BASED
REGULATION
The normative justification for CBA is broadly welfarist. It pro-
ceeds from a "God's eye" perspective that evaluates regulatory
policies on the basis of their aggregate costs and benefits for hu-
man well-being, summed across all affected persons. By contrast,
the normative justification for feasibility regulation is broadly
equity-based and specifically contractualist. It is rooted in com-
parative consideration of the perspective of each individual likely
to be affected by a particular regulatory policy or action.
This part draws on contractualism and normative pluralism to
defend the feasibility approach to risk regulation against two
prominent objections raised by its critics: (i) the feasibility ap-
143. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 17-22 (1998) (distinguishing between
"factoral" views that identify which normative factors or properties make acts wrong and
"foundational" views that explain why the identified normative factors are wrong-making).
144. See Frick, supra note 106, at 223 ("The aim and ambition of moral philosophy
should be to inform our judgment, by making us alive to the relevant ethical considera-
tions, not to abolish the need for judgment.").
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proach prescribes more stringent risk regulation than is norma-
tively appropriate in some cases (the "overregulation objection")
and (ii) the feasibility approach permits more lax regulation than
is normatively appropriate in other cases (the "underregulation
objection"). The overregulation objection charges that the feasibil-
ity principle requires investments in risk reduction that are not
justifiable in light of their costs. Masur and Posner argue, for ex-
ample, "[a] regulation that reduces risks of harm very little, while
imposing very high costs on consumers, should not be issued even
if it does not close any plants."'145 The underregulation objection,
on the other hand, charges that the feasibility principle unjustifi-
ably allows an industry to engage in dangerous practices merely
for the sake of ensuring its survival. In the words of Masur and
Posner, "[a] regulation that substantially reduces risks of harm
should be issued even if it closes many plants."'146 This article con-
siders each objection in turn.
A. Justifying Feasibility as a Floor for Risk Regulation
A prominent and familiar criticism of feasibility-based regula-
tion is that it results in more stringent regulation than is norma-
tively desirable, that it "overregulates."'147 When this criticism is
leveled, the underlying assumption is usually that the feasibility
approach is normatively indefensible to the extent that it results
in more stringent regulation than would be optimal from the
point of view of CBA.4 s This section defends feasibility regulation
from this objection by making two basic points. First, when the
feasibility approach results in more stringent regulation than
CBA would have, such "CBA-relative overregulation" is typically
justifiable on the basis of equity, interpreted as ex ante contrac-
145. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 702.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION 73-74 (2002); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 679 & n.99
("Industry groups frequently attack feasibility analysis for enabling more stringent regu-
lation than they deem appropriate" and "[t]his is in many cases a valid criticism.").
148. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 78 (1999); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 697 ("Ac-
cording to economic analysis, a firm should engage in a precaution when the marginal
benefits (in terms of reduced risk of harm to workers and others) exceed the marginal
costs, Feasibility analysis deviates from this approach. We can divide the deviations into
two categories--cases where feasibility analysis results in underregulation (relative to
economic optimality) and cases where it results in overregulation.") (emphasis added).
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tualism. Second, although it is theoretically possible for feasibil-
ity analysis to overregulate even relative to ex ante contractual-
ism, this theoretical possibility will rarely occur where, as is
commonly the case, the monetary costs of significantly reducing
the health risks posed by toxic substances or emissions are
spread among millions of consumers or shareholders.
1. Valuing Life v. Valuing Risks to Life
Suppose a given regulation is expected to save 100 lives at a
cost of $1 billion. Do the life-saving benefits of the regulation jus-
tify its monetary cost? At least since President Reagan's 1981 Ex-
ecutive Order directing federal regulatory agencies to engage in
cost-benefit analysis of all major regulations,'49 regulators have
been faced with the difficult task of answering these questions.
The approach regulatory agencies have taken is to convert the
health benefits of such a regulation-primarily, deaths avoided-
into the same currency as the regulation's cost-dollars. In the
early 1980s, the notion of a "value of statistical life" ("VSL") was
born, and has since been used pervasively by federal agencies
charged with regulating risks of death or serious bodily harm.'
How exactly do regulatory agencies calculate the VSL? This
question presents a dilemma. On one hand, the view that a sta-
tistical death should be prevented at any monetary cost strikes
many as implausible."' On the other hand, using willingness-to-
pay or willingness-to-accept as a method for attaching a mone-
tary value to life itself is problematic, since, except in very unu-
sual circumstances, no sane person would be willing to forfeit his
or her life in exchange for any amount of money.'2 How have
economists resolved this dilemma? Cass Sunstein and Eric Pos-
149. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (1981).
150. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537,
538, 549 (2005). Most federal regulatory agencies have converged on a VSL figure some-
where between $5 million and $6.5 million. Id. at 549; infra, Part IV.A.3 (discussing case
study of workplace risk regulation in which OSHA used a VSL of $6.8 million).
151. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 16 (1993) ("[E]very day, each of us implicitly evaluates risks to life. We
begin to run risks to achieve our daily objectives the instant we get out of bed.... We be-
lieve it worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the Grand Canyon in
soft plastic to catch those who might fall over the edge.").
152. See, e.g., Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 340.
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ner explain that the answer involves "real-world behavior, in
which workers and consumers receive compensation when they
are subject to risks of death.'53 Sunstein and Posner continue,
In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety has a
"price"; market evidence, involving the compensation people actually
receive, is investigated to identify that price. Agency valuations are
largely a product of studies of workplace risks, attempting to deter-
mine how much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards. The
relevant risks usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/
100,000. The calculation of the value of a statistical life (VSL) is a
product of simple arithmetic. Suppose... that workers must be paid
$600, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000. If so, the value of a
statistical life would be said to be $6 million.'
It is important to bear in mind that this method of attaching a
monetary value to human life is, in one very clear sense, based on
a fiction. There is a huge inferential leap from the empirical
proposition that an average worker would require a $600 pay-
ment to be exposed to a 1 in 10,000 risk of death to the proposi-
tion that a statistical worker's life has a value of $6 million. Ob-
viously, it cannot be inferred that an average worker would
forfeit their life in exchange for a monetary payment of any
amount of money, much less a payment of $6 million."5 To gener-
alize this point, it cannot be inferred that the amount a worker
would be willing to pay to eliminate a risk of death would in-
crease in a linear fashion as the risk itself increases. Although a
worker might be willing to pay only $600 for the elimination of a
1 in 10,000 risk of death, she might well be willing to pay more
than ten times as much to eliminate a risk ten times as great.
Judge Richard Posner has put this point as follows: "[C]ost-
benefit analysis values risks, and the so-called value of life that
cost-benefit analysts refer to is just a mathematical transfor-
mation."'5 6
153. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 150, at 551.
154. Id. Professor W. Kip Viscusi is generally credited with introducing the practice of
calculating VSL based on willingness-to-pay figures derived from actual labor market be-
havior. See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC,
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 19 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
155. See, e.g., Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 340.
156. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment
on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1160 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Cost-
Benefit Analysis]; see also supra Part lII.B (discussing Posner's point).
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This point has a critically important implication for the norma-
tive evaluation of risk regulation. Suppose an average person
would be willing to pay no more than $600 to eliminate a 1 in
10,000 risk of death. In welfarist terms, this would mean that
imposing a cost of more than $600 on a person would leave that
person worse off than imposing a 1 in 10,000 risk of death on
them would. This implies that if a government agency can ac-
complish a particular goal either by imposing a cost of, say, $2000
on Person A or imposing a 1 in 10,000 risk of death on Person B,
the right thing to do (from the standpoint of both overall well-
being and equity) is to impose the risk on Person B. Further, it
implies that if a government agency can accomplish a goal either
by imposing a cost of $50 on Person A or imposing a 1 in 10,000
risk of death on Person B, the right thing to do is to impose the
monetary cost on Person A."5 7
However, if Posner is right that CBA should be understood to
value risks to life rather than life itself, then it is problematic to
think the sorts of trade-offs described in the previous paragraph
straightforwardly entail the moral propriety of trade-offs of the
type often made when CBA is applied to government regulations
affecting large numbers of people. For example, suppose a regula-
tion will impose a cost of $8 million on an industry and save one
life. Taking $6 million as the value of a statistical life, the regula-
tion is not cost justified and so would be prohibited by standard
CBA. Posner's point suggests that, to be consistent with the
manner in which VSL is actually determined, CBA would need to
take into account not only the ex post life-saving impact of the
regulation (one life saved), but also the regulation's ex ante im-
pact on the risk to which each risk-bearer is exposed. For exam-
ple, if the regulation eliminates a I in 10,000 risk of death to
10,000 workers, the risk-exposed workers would be expected to
each pay $600 for that reduction in risk, a total of $6 million. Us-
ing willingness to pay as a measure of well-being implies that the
$8 million cost of the regulation exceeds its risk-reducing benefit.
However, if the regulation eliminates a 1 in 1000 risk of death to
1000 workers, it is quite possible that each worker would be will-
157. The point made in this sentence and the previous one assumes both persons would
experience the identical setback to their well-being as a result of the imposition of the
specified monetary cost. The same assumption is made with respect to the imposition of
the specified risk.
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ing to pay more than $8000 to eliminate that risk. If true, the
regulation becomes a cost effective one. Because, as Posner ob-
serves, the VSL is actually derived from workers' ex ante willing-
ness to take on risks of varying magnitudes, this suggests that
regulatory agencies need to move away from using a single VSL
figure to analyze the cost-effectiveness of risk regulations based
on ex post life-saving benefits or costs.158 CBA instead needs to be
calibrated to risk-bearers ex ante willingness to pay to avoid the
risks they are faced with.
Judge Posner's point might be stated as follows: when the costs
of reducing deaths and serious injuries caused by toxic substanc-
es primarily take the form of monetary losses, the way to achieve
an appropriate regulatory balance is to monetize the risks posed
to life and limb, rather than monetizing life and limb themselves.
Although Posner made this point in the context of discussing how
CBA ought to deal with cases in which life and limb are pitted
against monetary losses, the point has an important implication
for contractualist analysis as well. As will be seen in the following
section, a contractualist analysis of such cases will focus on a
comparison between the safety benefit a given regulation will
provide for each person exposed to the toxic substance at issue
and the corresponding monetary burden it will impose on each
person who will bear a share of the regulation's cost. In making
this comparison, we will need to convert the safety benefit into
the same currency as the regulatory cost. That is, it is necessary
to monetize the safety benefit to each risk-bearer. Judge Posner's
point suggests that the way to do so is via ex ante contractualism:
the regulatory benefit should be expressed as the amount of mon-
ey each risk-bearer would be willing to pay ex ante for a specified
reduction in their risk of death or devastating injury. The con-
tractualist analysis will center on a comparison between this fig-
ure and the amount of money each cost-bearer will be required to
pay to achieve the specified reduction in each risk-bearer's risk.
2. Equity, Individual Risk, and Individual Cost
Feasibility-based regulation typically (though not necessarily)
dictates more stringent regulation than cost-benefit analysis
158. See Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 156, at 1155.
[Vol. 50:12631302
EQUITY AND FEASIBILITY REGULATION
does.5s When that is the case, what is the normative basis for
pressing regulation beyond the point of cost-justification to the
point of maximum economic feasibility? The norm for providing a
basis for feasibility-based regulation in such circumstances is
that of equity, interpreted as ex ante contractualism.
As discussed in Part III, the norm of equity can provide a de-
fensible basis for choosing a policy or course of action that is
suboptimal from the perspective of overall well-being. If, for ex-
ample, the policy that is preferable from the standpoint of overall
well-being disproportionately disadvantages a particular person
or group of persons, it may be inequitable to pursue that policy,
notwithstanding its welfarist merits. Normative pluralism holds
that, depending on just how inequitable the policy would be to the
disadvantaged group, the all-things-considered morally proper
course of action may be to act equitably rather than according to
the dictates of welfarism.6 ° Normative pluralists believe welfarist
considerations have an important role to play in evaluating regu-
latory policy. However, the argument in this article is premised
on the notion that, in common regulatory circumstances, equita-
ble considerations may tend to prevail over welfarist considera-
tions. In particular, the case for pressing regulation beyond the
point dictated by CBA and up to the feasibility point rests square-
ly on considerations of equity.
The case for regulating past the point dictated by CBA and up
to the feasibility point can be stated straightforwardly using a
simple example. Suppose the 100,000 workers in a particular in-
dustry face a 1 in 10,000 annual risk of death from exposure to a
toxic chemical used in the industry's production process. Suppose
the risk can be eliminated at a total annual cost of $100 million,
which will be entirely passed on to the industry's five million an-
nual consumers in the form of a $20-per-unit price increase. As a
matter of morality, should the industry be required to make the
$100 million regulatory investment?
159. See KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 10, at 1237-41 (discuss-
ing a continuum of precautionary standards in which the feasibility standard is considered
less tolerant of risk than the cost-benefit balancing standard); Keating, Pressing Precau-
tion, supra note 11, at 684-85 (observing that feasibility regulation generally tolerates
less risk than the cost-justification standard); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 679 &
n.99 ("Industry groups frequently attack feasibility analysis for enabling more stringent
regulation than they deem appropriate.... This is in many cases a valid criticism.").
160. See supra Part III.C.
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Under standard welfarism, the answer is no. Assuming, as
above,6' that each worker would be willing to pay $600 to elimi-
nate the risk to him or her, the risk imposes a total cost of $60
million on the workers ($600 x 100,000 workers).'62 Because this
is substantially less than the $100 million cost of eliminating the
risk, the regulation is not cost-justified. Using willingness-to-pay
as a measure of well-being,'63 the regulation would reduce overall
well-being on net, and so is indefensible from the standpoint of
welfarism.
Analyzing the regulation from the standpoint of equity, one
needs to consider the costs and benefits it would impose on each
affected individual, rather than costs and benefits considered in
the aggregate. For each risk-bearing worker, the regulation con-
fers the benefit of eliminating a 1 in 10,000 risk of death. By hy-
pothesis, each worker would be willing to pay $600 for that bene-
fit. On the cost side, the regulation imposes a cost (in the form of
a price increase) of $20 on each of the five million consumers.
When adopting ex ante contractualism as an interpretation of
equity, the question is whether a consumer could reasonably re-
ject the imposition of a $20 cost so that each worker can avoid the
imposition of a 1 in 10,000 risk of death. Since each worker would
plausibly be willing to pay $600 to avoid a risk of that magnitude,
161. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
162. This calculation follows Judge Posner's recommendation that CBA be based on the
ex ante valuation of risks to life, rather than on the ex post valuation of lives lost. See
Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 156, at 1160-61. Had the ten lives expected to be
saved by the regulation resulted from the elimination of a 1 in 1000 risk of death to 10,000
workers-rather than the elimination of a 1 in 10,000 risk of death to 100,000 workers-
the regulation's aggregate benefit would plausibly be significantly more than $60 million.
As Judge Posner's discussion suggests, a worker would plausibly be willing to pay more
than ten times as much money to eliminate a 1 in 1000 risk of death than she would be
willing to pay to eliminate a 1 in 10,000 risk of death.
163. For purposes of simplifying my analysis here, I assume that all individuals poten-
tially affected by a particular risk imposition have the identical level of pre-existing
wealth and identical degree of aversion to risk. With these assumptions in place, (i) each
affected individual will experience the identical loss (or gain) in well-being as the result of
the imposition of a given monetary cost (or credit) or as the result of a given increase (or
reduction) in their risk of death or serious injury, and (ii) each risk-bearer will be willing
to pay the identical amount of money for a specified reduction in their risk of death or se-
rious injury. Of course, CBA must confront the same difficulty. See Matthew D. Adler,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview 10-15 (Aug. 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2313388
(explaining how distributionally weighted cost-benefit analysis can take account of vary-
ing levels of individual wealth and the diminishing marginal utility of money).
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the choice is between imposing a $20 cost on each cost-bearing
consumer (if the regulation is adopted) or imposing what is effec-
tively a $600 cost on each risk-bearing worker (if the regulation is
not adopted). Intuitively, it seems clear that no consumer could
reasonably reject having to pay an extra $20 so that each worker
can avoid a cost that is thirty times as great. A consumer might
wish to reject the risk-reducing price increase, but they could not
reasonably do so, as that would effectively mean asking each
worker to shoulder an additional cost of $600 so each consumer
could avoid an additional cost of $20.164
Just as considerations of equity militated in favor of Policy Two
in the Policy Choice hypothetical,'65 so do they militate in favor of
adopting the $100 million regulation here. Although the regula-
tion is not cost-justified in the aggregate, it provides each risk-
bearing worker with a risk reduction benefit worth $600 while
imposing a cost of $20 on each cost-bearing consumer. A consum-
er could not reasonably refuse to accept the regulation's $20 per
capita monetary cost so that each worker can enjoy the $600 per
capita safety benefit she would miss out on, were the regulation
not adopted.
This example is an interesting one because considerations of
equity and overall well-being point in opposite directions. Norma-
tive pluralists believe such cases require a considered judgment
about which of the norms should prevail. In some cases, consider-
ations of overall well-being will prevail over considerations of eq-
uity; in others, the opposite will be true.
Contractualist considerations appear to trump welfarist con-
siderations in the above example in virtue of two facts. First, tak-
en in the aggregate, the monetary costs of the regulation exceed
its monetized safety benefits, but not dramatically so. The $100
million cost of the regulation is not even twice the amount of the
$60 million safety benefit. In other words, welfarist considera-
164. More technically, recall that contractualism holds that the right course of action is
one that satisfies the "minimax" criterion, i.e., the course of action under which the burden
borne by the most-burdened individual is less weighty than the burden borne by the most-
burdened individual under any alternative course of action. See supra Part III.A. Imple-
menting the regulation is the course of action that satisfies the minimax criterion since it
imposes a far less weighty burden on the consumer (a $20 monetary cost) than the alter-
native course of action-not implementing the regulation-imposes on the worker (an in-
creased risk equivalent to a monetary cost of $600).
165. See infra Part III.A.
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tions weigh against the regulation, but relatively weakly. Second,
equitable considerations weigh strongly in favor of the regulation.
When the regulation's costs and benefits are viewed from the per-
spective of each affected individual, it becomes clear that the cost
to each worker of not implementing the regulation is thirty times
as great as the cost to each consumer of implementing it. Equita-
ble considerations prevail over considerations of overall well-
being here because they dramatically favor implementing the
regulation, whereas welfarist considerations weigh only weakly
in the opposite direction. Consider the following real-world exam-
ple of the same phenomenon.
3. Case Study: Hexavalent Chromium
Hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)) is a toxic substance used in a
number of industries.'66 Compounds containing chromium are
used for metal electroplating and to produce "chemical catalysts
and pigments for textile dyes, paints, inks, glass, and plastics."'67
Chromium "compounds are also [formed] incidentally.., as a by-
product of certain welding processes, and as an impurity found in
portland cement. ' "According to OSHA, there are over 30 indus-try sectors in which workers may be exposed to" chromium.9
"Compounds containing [chromium] can exist in mist, dust, or
fume form, and have long been known to [pose health risks to
workers] when inhaled, or upon contact with skin."'70 Most signif-
icantly, exposure to chromium can cause lung cancer, which is of-
ten fatal.'7' Chromium exposure can also cause nonfatal ailments
such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal
ulcers.7 2
166. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 168-
69 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying petition challenging OSHA's regulation of hexavalent chromi-
um except with respect to the employee notification aspects of the standard).
167. Id. at 169.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 169-70; see also Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed.
Reg. 10,100, 10,224 (Feb. 28, 2006).
172. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,108, 10,166,
10,174.
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In 1971, OSHA set a PEL for chromium of 52 micrograms per
cubic meter (g/m). 173 By 2004, chromium's carcinogenic proper-
ties had become clear, and OSHA consequently proposed reducing
the chromium exposure standard to 1 jig/m3.74 In 2006, after ex-
tensive comments and hearings, OSHA issued its final rule,
which set a somewhat higher chromium PEL of 5 gg/m'."7'
OSHA calculated that, at the then-existing PEL of 52 jig/m3 ,
exposure to chromium over a forty-five-year, full-time working
life would cause between 101 and 351 deaths for every 1000
workers,176 translating into a lifetime risk of death between 10.1%
and 35.1% for each worker. OSHA then computed the risks of
lung cancer deaths at six lower PELs (20, 10, 5, 1, 0.5, and 0.25
ig/m3), with the following results:
Table 1
Percentage Chance of Lung Cancer Death from
Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium
17
Cr(VI) 20-Year 45-Year 20-Year One-Year
Concentration Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
78
(A g/rn) Median
52 4.3-19.8 10.1-35.1 12.05 0.603 (1 in 166)
20 1.7-8.3 4.1-16.4 5.0 0.25 (1 in 400)
10 0.9-4.3 2.1-8.6 2.6 0.13 (1 in 769)
5 0.43-2.2 1.0-4.5 1.315 0.06575 (1 in 1,521)
1 0.085-0.44 0.21-0.91 0.263 0.0131 (1 in 7,619)
0.5 0.043-0.22 0.11-0.46 0.132 0.0066 (1 in 15,152)
0.25 0.021-0.11 0.053-0.23 0.0033 0.00314 (1 in 30,303)
173. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 557 F.3d at 169.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,224 tbl.VII-1.
177. See id.; id. at 10,195 tbl.VI-7.
178. The occupational risk of lung cancer death from one year of exposure to hexava-
lent chromium has been computed by dividing the median risk for twenty-year exposure
by twenty. Although OSHA did not provide one-year risk figures in its report on hexava-
lent chromium, OSHA stated that its "risk estimates are roughly proportional to duration
for any given exposure concentration." See id. at 10,224.
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In addition to computing individual risk for varying levels and
durations of exposure to chromium, OSHA also calculated the
annual costs and monetized benefits of setting the chromium PEL
at the various alternative levels it was considering.'79 The benefits
included the prevention of both fatal and nonfatal cancers.'° To
monetize the avoidance of fatal cancers, OSHA adopted EPA's
then-prevailing $6.8 million VSL; to monetize the avoidance of
nonfatal cancers, OSHA employed an analysis based on both the
VSL and a cost-of-illness approach.' The following table summa-
rizes the results of OSHA's cost-benefit analysis.
Table 2
Annual Monetized Net Benefits From A Reduction in Exposure to
Hexavalent Chromium
(dollar figures refer to millions of 2003 dollars)
l
1
2
PEL (It g/m') .25 .5 1 5 10 20
Monetized Benefits $475 $449 $414 $270 $176 $88
(Discounted at 7%)
183
Monetized Benefits $888 $836 $773 $504 $331 $165
(Discounted at 3%)184
Costs (Discounted at 7%) $1,815 $1,033 $570 $282 $170 $112
Costs (Discounted at 3%) $1,762 $996 $552 $273 $165 $109
Net Benefit (7% Discount -$1,340 -$584 -$156 -$12 $6 -$24
Rate) I
Net Benefit (3% Discount -$874 -$160 $221 $231 $165 $56
Rate)
179. See id. at 10,305, 10,307.
180. See id. Based on various scientific studies, OSHA estimated ranges of the annual
cancer-prevention benefits of setting the chromium PEL at the various alternative levels it
was considering. For annual avoided lung cancer deaths, the reported ranges for each PEL
were as follows: .25: 66-258; .5: 62-243; 1: 58-224; 5: 40-145; 10: 27-95; 20: 15-47. Id. at
10,304 tbl.VIII-10. For annual avoided non-fatal cancers, the reported ranges for each
PEL were as follows: .25: 9-35; .5: 8-33; 1: 8-31; 5: 5-20; 10: 4-13: 20: 2-6. Id.
181. See id. at 10,305.
182. See id. at 10,306 tbl.VIII-11, 10,308 tbl.VIII-12.
183. The figures in this row represent the median values of the monetized benefit
ranges in the OSHA report using a 7% discount rate. The range of monetized benefits re-
ported for each PEL were as follows (in millions of 2003 dollars): .25: $60-$891; .5: $57-
$841; 1: $53-$776; 5: $36-$504; 10: $25-$328; 20: $13-$162. See id. at 10,306 tbl.VIII-11.
184. The figures in this row represent the median values of the monetized benefit
ranges in the OSHA report using a 3% discount rate. The range of monetized benefits re-
ported for each PEL were as follows (in millions of 2003 dollars): .25: $189-$1587; .5:
$176-$1496; 1: $164-$1382; 5: $112-$896; 10: $77-$584; 20: $41-$288. See id.
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In Table 2 above, the 5 jg/m3 PEL column is shaded to indicate
the exposure level OSHA ultimately found to satisfy the economic
feasibility standard and the level at which the new chromium
PEL was fixed."8 5 In the bottom two rows showing net benefits for
the two discount rates OSHA considered, the bolded figures rep-
resent the largest net benefit capable of being realized among the
alternative PELs being considered by OSHA. Discounting costsri/ 186
and median monetized benefits by 7%, the greatest net benefit
($6 million) would be realized at a PEL of 10 pg/m3 . Discounting
costs and median monetized benefits by 3%, the greatest net ben-
efit ($231 million) would be realized at a PEL of 5 jg/m3.
Under the assumption of a 7% discount rate,8 7 the feasible lev-
el of regulation (a PEL of 5 jig/m3) is more stringent than the lev-
el of regulation that maximizes net social benefits (a PEL of 10
jg/m3). In such circumstances, the feasible level of regulation is
suboptimal from the point of view of overall well-being. As Table
2 indicates, compared with the welfare-maximizing 10 jg/m3 PEL,
requiring firms within the regulated industries to adhere to a
more stringent PEL of 5 jg/m3 would impose marginal costs of
$112 million, while resulting in marginal monetized benefits of
only $94 million. What, then, is the case for lowering the PEL to
that more stringent level?
The case rests on considerations of equity, interpreted as ex
ante contractualism. Contractualism directs our attention away
185. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 169
(3d Cir. 2009).
186. OSHA relied on an assumption of a 7% discount rate in its analysis of costs, add-
ing an alternative 3% discount rate calculation as part of what it called a "sensitivity
analysis" when calculating net monetized benefits. See Occupational Exposure to Hexava-
lent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,263 ("[A]ll costs are annualized at a discount rate of 7
percent. (A sensitivity analysis using a discount rate of 3 percent is presented in the dis-
cussion of net benefits.)").
187. The analysis here assumes a 7% discount rate because, under that assumption,
feasibility regulation "overregulates" relative to CBA, i.e., feasibility analysis dictates a
more stringent chromium PEL than cost-benefit analysis would. As the bottom row of Ta-
ble 2 indicates, if a 3% discount rate is assumed, then the 5 sg/m3 PEL is both the econom-
ically feasible and cost-justified (welfare-maximizing) level of regulation, based on the
median values in the ranges of monetized benefits provided in OSHA's report for each
PEL. See supra Part IV.A.3 tbl.2. As Masur and Posner point out, it is only if both a high-
er-than-median value for monetized benefits is used and a 3% discount rate is assumed
that a more stringent 1 pg/m3 PEL is cost-justified and feasibility regulation consequently
underregulates relative to CBA. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 673, 679-80. For
discussion of cases in which the feasible level of regulation is less stringent than the cost-
justified level, see infra Part IV.B.
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from aggregate costs and benefits and toward the monetary costs
imposed on each individual cost-bearer and the safety benefits
realized by each individual risk-bearing worker. Here, as Table 1
indicates, a worker's annual risk of lung cancer death from expo-
sure to 10 gg/m3 of hexavalent chromium is .13%, or roughly 1 in
769.188 Lowering a worker's exposure to 5 gg/m3 reduces her an-
nual risk of death to .06575%, or roughly 1 in 1521. Reducing the
PEL from the cost-justified level of 10 jIg/m 3to the feasible level of
5 gg/i 3 therefore reduces each worker's annual risk of death by
roughly half in relative terms, and by .06425% in absolute terms.
What would an average, rational worker be willing to pay for
such a reduction in her risk of death? Using OSHA's $6.8 million
figure as the value of a statistical life, a worker would be willing
to pay $4369 for this risk reduction.
The marginal cost of accomplishing this reduction in each
worker's annual risk of death was estimated by OSHA to be $112
million in total.189 A contractualist analysis requires determining
how this cost was distributed among the individuals responsible
for bearing it. Since considerations of equity relate to the costs
and benefits experienced by each affected individual-rather
than costs and benefits considered in the aggregate-the relevant
comparison is one between each risk-bearer's reduction in risk
and each cost-bearer's share of the cost of accomplishing that re-
duction. As seen above, reducing the chromium PEL from 10 to 5
gg/m would result in a reduction of each worker's annual risk of
lung cancer death from 1 in 769 to 1 in 1521. What would each
cost-bearer's per capita share of the $112 million total cost be?
This question is impossible to answer with precision and diffi-
cult to estimate. Costs will generally either be passed on to con-
sumers in the form of price increases or absorbed by firms in the
form of reductions to profits.9 ' From OSHA's chromium report, it
188. OSHA indicated in its report that, as of 2006, 40,536 U.S. workers were exposed
to chromium levels of 10 pg/m3 or greater, and 68,295 U.S. workers were exposed to chro-
mium levels of 5 pg/m3 or greater. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium,
71 Fed. Reg. at 10,253-55 tbl.VII-2.
189. This figure represents the difference between the $170 million cost of achieving
the 10 pgm3 PEL and the $282 million cost of achieving the 5 pg/m3 PEL. See supra Table
2.
190. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,280.
("Price elasticity refers to the relationship between the price charged for a service and the
demand for that service; that is, the more elastic the relationship, the less able is an es-
tablishment to pass the costs of compliance through to its customers in the form of a price
1310 [Vol. 50:1263
EQUITY AND FEASIBILITY REGULATION
is difficult to determine either the proportion of regulatory costs
that would be passed to consumers or the amount of any per-unit
price increases by which such pass-throughs would be accom-
plished. The OSHA report does provide some helpful information,
however. OSHA determined that firms in over thirty different in-
dustry sectors would be affected by the new chromium regula-
tion."' Many of the firms in these industry sectors-those in the
welding and construction sectors-may primarily serve other
businesses rather than individual consumers, so multiple cost
pass-throughs may occur before a regulatory cost reaches an in-
dividual "end user."
If the $112 million marginal cost of lowering the chromium
PEL from 10 pg/m' to 5 tg/m3 were distributed among ten million
consumers, each consumer's per capita share would be $11.20; if
distributed among one million consumers, each consumer's share
would be $112; and if distributed among 100,000 consumers, each
consumer's share would be $1120. Only if the total regulatory
cost of moving from a 10 gg/m3 to 5 pg/m3 PEL were equally dis-
tributed among less than 30,000 consumers would each consum-
er's per capita share of that cost begin to approach the $4352 per-
worker effective cost of opting for a 10 gg/m3 PEL instead of a 5
11g/m 3 PEL.
Other commentators analyzing feasibility-based regulation
have assumed that regulatory costs would be primarily passed on
to consumers in the form of price increases of less than $100 per
unit.9 2 Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, it seems reasona-
ble to assume the $112 million cost of lowering the chromium
PEL from 10 gg/m3 to 5 jig/m3 would, if entirely passed through,
increase and the more it will have to absorb the costs of compliance from its profits.").
191. See id. at 10,271-79 tbl.VIII-7.
192. See, e.g., Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 314 (offering example of feasibil-
ity regulation involving a $10 million regulatory cost passed through to consumers in the
form of a $10-per-unit price increase on television sets); id. at 323 ("Proposed environmen-
tal regulations not producing widespread plant closures generally lead to agency predic-
tions of modest price increases."); Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 674
("Pressing precaution beyond the point of cost-justification will confer great benefits on
some at the cost of trivial losses to others."); Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 707-08
(discussing the possibility that feasibility analysis is based on a version of welfarism hold-
ing that "it is wrong for an agency to hold off regulating a substance that damages work-
ers' lungs so that consumer products will be a few dollars cheaper"); id. at 703-04 (refer-
ring to the per-consumer costs imposed by feasibility regulation as "small costs" that
consumers incur "because prices rise").
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be distributed among at least 1 million consumers for a per-capita
cost of $112. With this conservative assumption in place, it is
clear that considerations of equity would weigh strongly in favor
of feasibility regulation in the case of occupational exposure to
chromium. A reduction in each worker's risk of lung cancer death
worth $4369 can be achieved at a cost of $112 to each cost-bearer.
Per contractualism, it would clearly be unreasonable for a con-
sumer to reject a $112 price increase so that a worker can avoid
an increased risk of death equivalent to a $4369 cost (nearly forty
times as great as the price increase). Further, considerations of
overall well-being weigh only weakly against feasibility regula-
tion. Lowering the chromium PEL from 10 pg/m3 to 5 pg/m3 re-
duces the net benefit of regulation from $6 million to -$12 mil-
lion, a difference of $18 million. This is a rather modest reduction
in (monetized) overall well-being considering the scale of the total
costs-between $170 and $282 million-and total monetized ben-
efits-between $176 and $270 million-involved. The $112 mil-
lion marginal cost of reducing the chromium PEL from 10 pg/m3
to 5 gg/m3 is just 120% of the size of the corresponding marginal
monetized safety benefit. By contrast, each worker's marginal
safety benefit is roughly 4000% the size of each consumer's mar-
ginal monetary burden. Thus, the feasibility-based regulation of
chromium can be strongly defended on the basis of a normative
pluralism encompassing considerations of equity and overall well-
being.
4. Response to Objections
This equity-based defense of feasibility regulation as a floor is
not vulnerable to the chief objections made by advocates of CBA.
The defense offered here does not hold that any amount of money
ought to be spent to prevent even a single death, so long as the
existence or stability of the regulated industries is not threat-
ened. If equity is interpreted as ex ante contractualism, then con-
siderations of equity would weigh against a regulatory expendi-
ture that would impose a monetary burden on each cost-bearer
that exceeds the monetized risk-reduction benefit it would pro-
vide to each risk-bearer. For example, suppose a one in one mil-
lion risk of death for one million workers could be eliminated at a
regulatory cost of $1 billion distributed equally among one million
consumers (a per capita cost of $1000 per consumer). Suppose
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further that this cost could be borne without threatening the ex-
istence or competitive stability of the regulated industries. Since
it is feasible to prevent a death, is there a normative basis for not
doing so? Ex ante contractualism would hold that there is. Be-
cause no risk-bearing worker would rationally be willing to pay
$1000 to eliminate a one in one million risk of death to herself, it
would be inequitable to ask a consumer to make that investment
on each worker's behalf. From the standpoint of ex ante contrac-
tualism, equity requires that consumers not be required to bear
this monetary burden.
Thus, this article's defense of feasibility as a "floor" for risk
regulation is, in this respect and from a purely theoretical stand-
point, a qualified one-it does not hold that regulation up to the
point of economic feasibility is normatively defensible in every
conceivable instance. Its claim is that in the typical regulatory
scenario, the point of economic feasibility will be reached before
the point at which the marginal per capita cost of regulation
would exceed the marginal per capita monetized risk reduction
benefit. For example, at the chromium PEL found by OSHA to be
feasible (5 ptg/m'), each worker's marginal monetized risk reduc-
tion benefit ($4369 compared with a PEL of 10 pg/m3) far exceed-
ed each consumer's share of the corresponding marginal cost
($112, assuming the costs were distributed among one million
consumers).'93 This tends to be the case because regulatory costs
are frequently distributed among a vast number of consumers or
shareholders-making each cost-bearer's share of such costs rela-
tively trivial-while, as Table 1 demonstrates in the case of
chromium,"' the risk reduction benefits of significantly lowering
levels of exposure to toxic substances are often substantial for
each risk-bearer.
It follows that a defense of feasibility regulation based on ex
ante contractualism is not vulnerable to the charge that, as Ma-
sur and Posner put it, "[o]verregulation occurs because feasibility
analysis ignores the cost of regulations to consumers-the costs
they incur because prices rise or products disappear from the
market."'95 Unlike Driesen's "concentration principle," which ac-
193. See supra Part IV.A.3.
194. See supra Table 1.
195. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 704.
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cords no weight to widely distributed regulatory costs,196 ex ante
contractualism does give such costs weight. Ex ante contractual-
ism holds that even a relatively modest per-capita cost cannot
justifiably be placed on consumers if the resulting reduction in
risk for each risk-bearer is negligible or sufficiently tiny."7 As
noted above, the crucial empirical corollary to the equity-based
defense offered in this article is that, as a matter of actual fact,
this will rarely be the case when it comes to the regulation of tox-
ic substances or emissions. If that is true, then in the vast majori-
ty of cases pressing regulation beyond the cost-justified point to
the point of economic feasibility, will be defensible.
5. The Role of Job Loss
This defense of the feasibility point as a floor for risk regula-
tion has so far focused on situations in which the costs of regula-
tion would be passed on to consumers in the form of price in-
creases. What, though, about a situation in which firms within an
industry are not able to pass on all of the regulatory costs to con-
sumers and choose instead to meet those costs by laying off work-
ers? Even if firms are able to pass regulatory costs on to consum-
ers, what if price increases result in a reduction in consumer
demand that, in turn, leads to worker layoffs? In such circum-
stances-where job losses are among the costs of pressing regula-
tion up to (though not beyond) the feasibility point--can such
regulation be defended on the basis of ex ante contractualism?
Under ex ante contractualism, the relevant comparison in such
circumstances would be between the increased risk of job loss im-
posed on each worker within an industry as the result of the reg-
ulation and the decreased risk of death or serious injury the regu-
lation yields for each risk-bearing individual. In cases where the
industry's health risks fall primarily on its workers, the question
196. See Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 319. See supra Part II.A. Keating's de-
fense of feasibility-regulation is vulnerable to roughly the same objection. By holding that
the only burden comparable in strength to the imposition of a significant risk of death or
devastating injury is the cessation of a major productive activity, Keating seems to imply
that pressing precaution to the feasibility point would be justified even when the marginal
costs of doing so for each cost-bearer exceeded the marginal benefit for each risk-bearer.
See supra Part II.B.
197. Dov Waisman, Reasonable Precaution for the Individual, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
653, 672 n.69, 690-91 (2014).
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is whether pressing regulation to the feasibility point provides a
safety benefit to each worker that outweighs the increased risk of
job loss imposed on each worker. If it does, then regulation to the
feasibility point is to the ex ante advantage of each worker and,
for that reason, is defensible on the basis of ex ante contractual-
ism, assuming the risk of job loss is the greatest ex ante burden
imposed on any individual by the regulation.
For example, suppose reducing the chromium PEL from 10
gg/m3 to 5 gg/m3 were associated with a 10% risk of job loss' s for
each worker within the regulated industries. If a worker would,
as noted above, be willing to pay $4369 per year for the associat-
ed reduction in their annual risk of lung cancer death,'99 the ques-
tion is whether this benefit outweighs the welfare setback associ-
ated with a 10% risk of job loss.
Answering that question involves determining what a worker
would be willing to pay to avoid a job loss risk of that magnitude.
In a recent paper, Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner concluded
that the monetized lifetime cost of a job loss-taking into account
both lifetime earnings losses and nonpecuniary losses such as in-
creased mortality risk and unhappiness-is well over $100,000,
and perhaps even as high as $260,000.200 If that is true, a ration-
al, fully informed worker might be willing to pay as much as
$26,000 to avoid a 10% risk of job loss. However, this figure must
be compared with the $4369 per year that a rational worker
would be willing to pay for the reduction in their risk of lung can-
198. OSHA's feasibility analysis did not specifically analyze the employment impacts
of its regulation of chromium, so I use a 10% risk of job loss simply for the sake of illustra-
tion. There is reason to doubt whether regulating up to the feasibility point would normal-
ly pose a risk of job loss that is as high as 10%. If feasibility regulation tolerates the bank-
ruptcy of marginal firms-but not massive disruption or widespread plant closings-the
increased job loss risk associated with pressing regulation up to the feasibility point seems
unlikely to be quite that high in most cases. See, e.g., EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE
NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FOR SOURCE
CATEGORY: PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTION; EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES,
PRETREATMENT STANDARDS, AND NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: PULP, PAPER,
AND PAPER BOARD CATEGORY-PHASE I, at 6-15 tbl.6-4, 6-35 tbl.6-15 (Oct. 27, 1997) (esti-
mating that feasibility-based regulation of chemical runoff from pulp and paper mills un-
der the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act would result in the loss of 5711 of the 90,840
jobs in the regulated industries, thereby posing a job loss risk of 6.3% to each worker in
those industries).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
200. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579, 618 (2012).
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cer death. Over the course of a full working lifetime of forty years,
the monetized benefit associated with the reduction in the work-
er's annual risk of death from lung cancer-$174,760-dwarfs the
$26,000 benefit associated with avoiding a 10% risk of job loss.
On these assumptions, regulating up to the feasibility point
would be in the worker's ex ante interest, notwithstanding the
nontrivial risk of job loss such regulation might pose.
Of course, this is just one particular example, one in which the
feasibility regulation resulted in both a significant decrease in
each risk-bearer's risk of death and, I have assumed for the sake
of argument, a substantial increase in each worker's risk of job
loss. A regulation that yielded a smaller reduction in each risk-
bearer's risk of death might not be justifiable on ex ante contrac-
tualist grounds if the resulting increase in job loss risk were suf-
ficiently large. Had the chromium regulation reduced each work-
er's annual risk of death by just 1 in 10,000 (rather than, as was
actually the case, closer to 1 in 1000), the regulation would still
have narrowly worked to each worker's ex ante advantage over
the course of a forty-year working lifetime, even if it posed a job
loss risk of 10% to each worker. However, once the annual reduc-
tion in death risk accomplished by a regulation falls much below
1 in 10,000, the regulation might not be justifiable under ex ante
contractualism if it posed a 10% risk of job loss to each affected
worker."°1 And this would be true whether the risk at issue fell on
workers or on some other groups of persons, such as those living
in proximity to industry plants.
B. Justifying Feasibility as a Ceiling for Risk Regulation
Another prominent criticism of feasibility regulation is that it
"underregulates" relative to CBA-that it may unjustifiably dic-
tate a lower level of precaution than is optimal from a welfarist
point of view. According to Masur and Posner, "[u]nderregulation
201. For a worker exposed to a risk of death over the course of a forty-year working
lifetime, the regulation would have to provide the worker with a safety benefit equivalent
to $650 per year to justify a 10% risk of job loss, assuming a job loss imposes a monetized
loss of $260,000. Assuming a $6.8 million VSL, this would mean the regulation would
have to reduce the worker's annual risk of death by roughly 1 in 10,000 annually to be jus-
tifiable. While I have not collected data across all OSHA regulations, the chromium regu-
lation suggests that workplace health regulations can and do yield much larger reductions
in each worker's annual risk of death than 1 in 10,000.
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occurs because feasibility analysis tolerates dangerous industrial
practices if regulation would shut down plants.""2
What, then, is the justification for capping safety expenditures
at the point of maximum economic feasibility? Should an industry
be allowed to cease investing in measures that lower the risks it
generates on the basis that further investment would threaten
the industry's survival or result in widespread plant shutdowns?
Under what circumstances, if any, should increased risks to hu-
man life be tolerated merely for the sake of preserving an indus-
try or avoiding mass job losses? Should it depend on whether the
industry at issue delivers major, life-improving benefits-say, the
pharmaceutical industry-as opposed to luxuries or convenienc-
es? Answering these questions requires consideration of a more
basic question: if an activity poses a significant and ineliminable
risk of death or serious injury to a large number of people, on
what grounds is it morally permissible to engage in the activity at
all?
1. If an Industrial Activity Carries a Significant Risk of Death or
Serious Injury, Why Do It at All?
If we know for certain that a number of workers will suffer ac-
cidental death in building a large suspension bridge, why allow
the bridge to be built? If we know for certain that dust emitted by
cement factories will cause a number of persons in surrounding
communities to develop cancer or lung disease, why allow the
manufacture of cement?
The welfarist answer to such questions would center on a com-
parison between the total costs of the activity (including its mon-
etized life-and-limb accident costs) and the total benefits. A wel-
farist would maintain it is permissible to engage in the risky
activity notwithstanding its expected costs if it increases overall
well-being on net, i.e., if the total benefits delivered outweigh the
total costs imposed. If the activity is such that, no matter how
great the investment in safety precautions and other risk-
reducing measures, the total costs it imposes exceed the total
202. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 704; see also id. at 702 ("A regulation that sub-
stantially reduces risks of harm should be issued even if it closes many plants.").
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benefits it delivers, welfarism would conclude it is morally im-
permissible to engage in the activity."'
A contractualist answer to these questions would also center on
a comparison between benefits and burdens, though a nonaggre-
gative one. An ex ante contractualist would maintain it is per-
missible to engage in a risky activity only if there exists some
level of safety precaution at which the benefit the activity deliv-
ers to the person it most benefits exceeds the expected burden the
activity places on the person to whom it poses the gravest risk. In
other words, if the burden the activity places on the person to
whom it poses the greatest risk is greater than the burden the ac-
tivity's discontinuation (or absence) would place on its greatest
would-be beneficiary, ex ante contractualism would not allow the
activity to go forward."4
Whether one approaches the question from a welfarist or con-
tractualist perspective, the normative case for engaging in risky
activities rests on the life-improving, life-extending, liberty-
enhancing benefits such activities provide. Such benefits can
come in the form of consumption (of the good or service the activi-
ty provides), employment (in the activity's production processes),
or additions to wealth (as a share of profits from the activity). A
normative pluralist would evaluate any risky activity through
both a welfarist and a contractualist lens, making a considered
judgment about whether it is morally permissible to engage in
the activity when welfarism and contractualism disagree about
whether, at a given level of regulation, the activity is beneficial
on net."5 Taking both welfarist and contractualist considerations
into account, a normative pluralist would determine whether a
203. See Fried, supra note 138, at 60 ("If, however much we spend on safety, the sum of
lives lost plus safety costs will be greater than the social benefits, it does not make sense
to go ahead with the project at all.").
204. See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 735-36, 736 n.187 ("It is im-
portant to recall that matters are more complex when terminating an activity would be to
the advantage of those most endangered by it in the sense we have defined, but would im-
pose a comparable burden on others who benefit from the activity. Then we must decide if
the benefit to those others is greater than the burden of significant risk to the most en-
dangered. In the kind of case we are considering, this would happen when the burden to
shareholders and consumers of shutting down a major productive activity is greater than
the burden to workers of bearing a significant risk of injury.").
205. See supra Part III.C for a more complete discussion of normative pluralism. See
also Frick, supra note 106, at 219-23 (discussing a pluralist account of moral rightness
embracing considerations of both equity and overall well-being).
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particular activity is all-things-considered beneficial at a speci-
fied level of regulation. If it is not, then normative pluralism
would deem it morally impermissible to engage in the activity at
that level of regulation.°6
All-things-considered beneficialness should operate as a nor-
mative side constraint on risk regulation. The justification for en-
gaging in risky activities at all is that, notwithstanding their
risks, many such activities deliver profound social benefits, in-
cluding the reduction of natural and manmade threats to bodily
integrity. If an activity is so dangerous that, no matter a regula-
tion's stringency, it will result in so many deaths or devastating
injuries as to prevent it from being all-things-considered benefi-
cial, then it should be impermissible to engage in the activity un-
der any circumstances. If the activity would be all-things-
considered beneficial at a specified level of regulation, but not at
any lower level, then it should be impermissible to engage in the
activity unless the specified level of regulation (or a greater level)
is observed. And more controversially, if the activity would be all-
things-considered beneficial at a specified level of regulation but
not viable for technological or economic reasons at a more strin-
gent level of regulation, then it should be permissible to engage in
the activity at the less stringent level, assuming there is no al-
ternative way of providing the same benefits without imposing
the same risks.
This line of reasoning has rather radical implications for the
regulation of industrial and environmental risks in the developed
world. Commercial profitability is a poor proxy for all-things-
considered beneficialness due, in large part, to the phenomenon
of negative externalities.2 "7 Many of the health costs imposed on
society by industry are externalized to such an extent that were
those costs to be internalized, the industry might no longer be ca-
pable of maintaining profitability. Imposing all-things-considered
206. I set to the side the argument that it should be morally permissible to engage in
industrial activities that are not all-things-considered beneficial on net if those subject to
the activity's risks of harm knowingly and willingly assume such risks. For example, given
the harmful effects of inhaling tobacco smoke, it is doubtful whether the production of cig-
arettes is socially beneficial, all things considered. Yet that activity's existence might still
be defended on assumption of risk grounds.
207. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 93, 94-95 (2015) (discussing phenomenon of negative externalities generated
by industry).
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beneficialness as a constraint on commercial activity could mean
the legitimacy of at least some of the industries whose existence
we take for granted would be called into question, notwithstand-
ing their long-term commercial profitability."'
As will be discussed in more detail, the normative defense pre-
sented for the feasibility principle acknowledges that ensuring
the survival of an industry-the touchstone of feasibility-based
regulation-may at times be a goal inconsistent with engaging in
only those industrial activities whose benefits justify their costs,
all things considered. There may be cases where an industry's vi-
ability can be ensured only at the price of regulation so lax that
the industry's benefits cannot justify its life-and-limb accident
costs. To be sure, in such circumstances, feasibility-based regula-
tion lacking a side constraint of all-things-considered beneficial-
ness would be indefensible.
2. All-Things-Considered Beneficialness and Underregulation
In defending the feasibility point as a ceiling for risk regula-
tion, it is helpful to begin by asking: if one rejects a regulatory
standard that caps regulation at the point of maximum economic
feasibility, what is the alternative? The alternatives can be sepa-
rated into two groups: regulatory standards that would routinely
dictate a greater-than-feasible level of risk regulation and regula-
tory standards that would dictate a greater-than-feasible level of
regulation only occasionally. The primary example of a regulatory
standard that might routinely dictate a greater-than-feasible x-
penditure on precaution is a "safety" standard directing risks to
be reduced to the point at which they are no longer significant re-
gardless of cost or impact on the industry.29 The primary example
208. The tobacco industry is perhaps the best example of this.
209. See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 685 ("Safety-based regulations
require risk to be reduced to a point where no 'significant risk' of devastating injury re-
mains. Applying the safe level standard therefore does not require any inquiry into the
costs of risk reduction. All that it requires is a determination of the level at which the risk
created by exposure to the regulated substance ceases to be 'significant."'). For example,
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 takes a safety approach with respect to regulating
the level of pesticides present in food. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that pes-
ticide levels in pure and processed food be reduced to a level at which "there is a reasona-
ble certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical
residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures").
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of a regulatory approach that might occasionally, though not rou-
tinely, require a greater-than-feasible level of regulation is CBA.
Obviously, any regulatory standard that routinely dictated a
greater-than-feasible level of regulation would, if widely imposed,
effectively grind the economy to a halt. Industries incapable of
remaining economically viable if required to reduce their risks to
insignificant levels21° would cease to exist, depriving society of the
benefits they provide. The range of industrial activities thriving
in a modern, free market economy collectively provide immensely
important life-preserving, life-extending, and life-improving so-
cial benefits.21' Any regulatory standard that, if generally im-
posed, would bankrupt many or most of the industries within an
economy should therefore be rejected in light of the profound so-
cial harm certain to follow.21'
What about CBA? CBA is a regulatory standard that, presum-
ably, would not routinely dictate a greater-than-feasible level of
regulation. Indeed, there appears to be a general consensus
among commentators that CBA will generally dictate a less strin-
gent level of regulation than that dictated by the feasibility prin-
ciple.213 One cannot therefore reject CBA on grounds that, if gen-
erally adopted, it would largely eliminate the complex of life-
improving, life-extending benefits provided by industrial activity.
By hypothesis, general acceptance of CBA as a regulatory stand-
ard would not have that sort of stultifying effect on the economy.
However, CBA may occasionally dictate a more stringent level of
regulation than a feasibility standard would.1 4 If a regulatory
210. This is what a safety standard would require.
211. Just as one illustration, the world average life expectancy at birth in 1900 was
thirty-one years and under fifty years in even the richest countries. See WORLD HEALTH
ORG. HEALTH, HISTORY AND HARD CHOICES: FUNDING DILEMMAS IN A FAST-CHANGING
WORLD (Aug. 2006), http://www.who.int/global-health..histories/seminars/presentation07.
pdf. By the mid-20th century, the average rose to forty-eight years. By 2005, this figure
had risen to 65.6 years, and over eighty years in some countries. Id.
212. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 702 ("Any serious effort to reduce risks to
zero would require shutting down the economy (in the process no doubt making life less
healthy and more dangerous).").
213. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra
note 11, at 671 n.45 ("In general, cost-justified precaution is less protective of safety than
feasible precaution.., but not always.").
214. See Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 679 (arguing that this may have been the
case with respect to OSHA's regulation of hexavalent chromium); id. at 697 (contending
that the feasibility approach results in underregulation where "[a] low-cost precaution
technology can be cheaply developed but does not currently exist; [tihe industry has low
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standard is generally industry-preserving, what is the case for re-
jecting the standard in the exceptional case in which its adoption
would dictate a greater-than-feasible level of regulation, and
thereby threaten the existence or competitive stability of some
particular industry or group of industries? Put differently, where
a particular industry poses a particular risk, why should a threat
to the existence of the industry provide a basis for capping safety
expenditures at a sub-optimal level, i.e., below the level dictated
by CBA?
In answering this question, it is important to recall exactly
what the economic feasibility point is supposed to represent: the
point beyond which regulation would pose a threat to the exist-
ence or competitive stability of an industry. As noted in Part I,
this understanding is based directly on language in U.S. Supreme
Court and federal circuit court opinions interpreting the notion of
economic feasibility for purposes of the OSH Act.215 This implies
that regulation beyond the feasibility point poses a threat of mas-
sively disrupting the regulated industry or eliminating it alto-
gether,216 thereby depriving society of the benefits the industry
provides.
This understanding of what the feasibility point represents
leads naturally to a particular way of making the normative case
for capping regulation at that point. Specifically, the case for cap-
ping regulation at the feasibility point rests on the goal of pre-
serving the social benefits that the regulated industry provides,
benefits that would be eliminated or sharply reduced were regu-
lation pressed beyond the point of maximum economic feasibility.
To make this more concrete, consider an example offered by
Cass Sunstein:
[I]t would be wrong to think that CBA is more 'antiregulatory' than
a feasibility constraint. We can easily imagine a regulation that
might not be feasible, but that might satisfy a requirement of cost-
benefit balancing. Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost
$2 billion, that industry could not bear that cost without many busi-
revenues or precaution costs do not increase with revenue; or [t]he industry has low prof-
its").
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir.
1980) ("A standard is feasible if it does not threaten 'massive dislocation' to, or imperil the
existence of, the industry.") (internal citations omitted).
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ness failures, but that the regulation would save 5,000 lives. In some
cases, the cost-benefit requirement is more protective, not less pro-
217tective, of intended beneficiaries of regulatory programs.
In this example, under what circumstances, if any, would capping
regulatory expenditures at the feasibility point-which would
mean not implementing the $2 billion regulation and allowing the
5000 lives to be lost-be defensible from a moral point of view?
Suppose the industry at issue provides a product or service that
prevents the loss of life on a mass scale, e.g., the production of
vaccines against life-threatening disease or the operation of hos-
pitals. In such a case, if it could be shown that the industry would
result in the deaths of 5000 people through exposure to workplace
or environmental hazards, but that the industry would also save,
say, 10,000 lives that would otherwise be lost to disease, the
tradeoff becomes straightforward. If implementing the $2 billion
regulation means that so many firms go out of business as to ef-
fectively destroy the industry, the regulation saves 5,000 lives but
also causes 10,000 lives to be lost that would otherwise have been
saved by the industry. On that basis, it would arguably be moral-
ly improper to implement the $2 billion regulation, since the price
of doing so is that the life-saving, all-things-considered beneficial
industry ceases to exist. Note that this would be the case even
though-considered in the abstract-a regulatory investment of
$2 billion to save 5000 lives (at a cost of $400,000 per life saved)
is obviously cost-justified under the prevailing VSL figure of
roughly $6 million. There is, however, an important sense in
which this regulatory investment would not be cost-justified,
since one "cost" of making the $2 billion investment is losing the
industry and the net social benefit it delivers.
This point can be generalized. If, when an industry is regulated
to the point of maximum economic feasibility, the industry would
still deliver a net social benefit in the all-things-considered sense
specified above, then capping regulation at the feasibility point is
morally defensible, assuming there is no alternative means of
providing the same benefit without imposing the same level of
risk. To require greater-than-feasible risk reduction in such a
case is to deprive society of the benefits the industry delivers.
Crucially, this would be the case even if the feasible level of regu-
217. SUNSTEIN, supra note 147, at 74.
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lation happened to be suboptimal from the point of view of CBA.
If requiring a cost-justified regulatory investment means elimi-
nating an industry that is all-things-considered beneficial, the
cost-justified investment ought not to be made. Requiring the
cost-justified investment in such a case is tantamount to requir-
ing the disruption of an industrial activity that, from a moral
point of view, improves the state of the world on net and ought to
be pursued.218
How many industries, when regulated to the point of maximum
feasibility, would pass the test of all-things-considered beneficial-
ness described above? To consider a different variation of Sun-
stein's hypothetical, suppose the industry at issue were not one
whose existence directly resulted in the prevention of premature
death or serious illness. Suppose, for example, that the industry
at issue involved production of a nonessential good like televi-
sions.21 Unlike ceasing the production of vaccines for a life-
threatening disease, ceasing the manufacture of televisions would
not be expected to directly result in the loss of lives that would
otherwise have been saved. Many industries seem to be similar to
television manufacturing in this regard. If the health risks posed
by such an industry do routinely result in premature death or se-
rious illness for at least some people, on what basis could the in-
dustry still be deemed beneficial on net in the all-things-
considered sense specified above? Can the benefits associated
with the production of a nonessential good like televisions justify
the imposition of health risks that result in even a small number
of premature deaths or serious illnesses?
To make this question more concrete, let's return to Sunstein's
hypothetical, in which, when regulated to the point of maximum
feasibility, the industry at issue-taking television manufactur-
ing as our example-would generate health risks expected to re-
sult in the loss of 5000 lives. Assume these 5000 deaths would re-
sult from the imposition of a 1 in 1000 risk of death on 5 million
people. As above, it is critical to bear in mind that, if the industry
218. In correspondence concerning this issue, Professor Barbara Fried suggested to me
the possibility of the government subsidizing regulation in such a case, so that the life-
saving benefit can be realized without threatening the long-term viability of the regulated
industries. E-mail from Barbara Fried to Dov Waisman (June 24, 2014) (on file with au-
thor).
219. I borrow the example of television manufacturing from David Driesen. See Drie-
sen, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 314.
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truly has been regulated to the feasibility point, the only way to
further reduce the remaining risk is to eliminate the industry al-
together. That is just what it means to say that the industry's
health risks have been reduced to the maximum extent feasible.
Further risk reduction would necessitate the cessation of the in-
dustry.
A welfarist justification for the continued existence of the in-
dustry would begin by tallying the industry's benefits for the
well-being of all affected individuals, including consumers, work-
ers, and owners. The consumption-related benefits of television
are significant. Televisions provide access to programming con-
tent on which many millions of people regularly rely for infor-
mation and entertainment. Further, many workers earn their
livelihoods by participating in the manufacture of televisions, and
many more do so by participating in the production of program-
ming content intended exclusively for television broadcast. A wel-
farist defense of the industry would have to contend that these
consumption and employment benefits-summed over the mil-
lions of people in the world who enjoy them-outweigh the wel-
fare costs associated with 5000 people losing their lives prema-
turely.
One might reasonably balk at such a claim, however. Five
thousand premature deaths represent a huge social cost, one like-
ly also to cause significant welfare losses for the surviving family
and friends of the deceased. Are the employment and consump-
tion benefits associated with the manufacture of televisions-
even if enjoyed by millions-really sufficient to outweigh the wel-
fare losses associated with the premature death of 5000 people? A
welfarist might reasonably conclude that, under such facts, tele-
vision manufacturing takes more well-being away from the world
than it adds to it.
For a normative pluralist, a judgment that television manufac-
turing reduces overall well-being on net would not end the analy-
sis, however. The activity would still have to be evaluated from a
contractualist point of view. If television manufacturing is, when
regulated to the point of maximum feasibility, defensible from a
contractualist standpoint, it may still be beneficial all things con-
sidered.
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As noted above, an ex ante contractualist would deem televi-
sion production morally permissible if, when regulated to the
point of maximum feasibility, the benefit television manufactur-
ing stands to provide to the person it most benefits exceeds the
burden it places on the person to whom it poses the gravest risk.
The question, in other words, is: does the person who is placed at
greatest risk of death by the activity of television manufacturing
bear a greater burden than the discontinuation of television
manufacturing would impose on the person who most benefits
from that activity? Unless the answer to that question is "yes," no
one could reasonably reject the continuation of television manu-
facturing
At this point, the contractualist analysis divides into consider-
ation of two importantly different types of cases: cases in which
those placed at risk benefit directly from the risky activity and
cases in which risk-bearers derive no direct benefit from the ac-
tivity. First, suppose that all five million of the people exposed to
a 1 in 1000 risk of death from the activity of television manufac-
turing also directly benefit from that activity. If the risk of death
or serious injury is sufficiently low, bearing that risk might well
be desirable when the alternative is a world without television
manufacturing and the benefit it provides. From an ex ante point
of view, the continued existence of the industry-and the contin-
ued imposition of the risks it generates-could be justifiable to
each risk-bearer on the grounds that the alternative would leave
them worse off. For example, faced with a choice between being
exposed to a 1 in 1000 risk of death and losing her job, a worker
in a television factory might rationally prefer to be exposed to the
risk. Keating has referred to this sort of situation as one in which
bearing the risk works to the "ex ante advantage" of the risk-
bearer.22 ° In such a case, the risk-bearer could not reasonably re-
ject the continuation of television manufacturing (and the conse-
quent imposition of the risk on them) because she could not ra-
tionally do so. Although the risk, taken on its own, does impose a
burden, that burden may be more than offset by a certain benefit.
In other words, it may be that the risk-bearing beneficiary has no
net ex ante burden on the basis of which to object to the risky ac-
tivity, nor would it be in her interest to so object.
220. See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 680.
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This contractualist point could drive a judgment that the in-
dustry is all-things-considered beneficial when regulated to the
point of maximum economic feasibility, even if welfarism were to
deem the industry a net loser for the reasons discussed above.
Although the manufacture of televisions might, on the assump-
tions stated above, result in a net reduction in overall well-being,
it might still reasonably be considered socially beneficial all
things considered on the grounds that, from an ex ante stand-
point, those exposed to its risks could not rationally prefer its ces-
sation, and so could not reasonably reject its continuation. In oth-
er words, the ex ante contractualist justification for a risky
activity carries the day when everyone-even those to whom the
activity poses the greatest risk of death-experiences a net ex
ante benefit from the activity's existence.
The problem with this contractualist defense, however, is that
it is limited to situations in which those placed at risk by an in-
dustrial activity also benefit from that activity. Many risky in-
dustrial activities impose their risks at least partly on individuals
who cannot be said to benefit-whether as consumers, workers,
or in some other way-from the activity's existence. Think, for
example, of the subsistence fishermen who fish in a stream into
which a nearby television factory deposits the runoff chemicals
used in its production processes.221 Assume that the fishermen de-
rive no benefit from the activity of television production, as they
do not own televisions, never watch television, are not employed
in manufacturing televisions or producing television content, and
do not own any shares of television-related companies. If the ac-
tivity of television manufacturing results in premature deaths
among fishermen as the result of their ingesting runoff chemi-
cals, the sort of contractualist justification described above will
not work. Unlike workers at television factories, subsistence fish-
ermen would be left better off were television manufacturing to
cease, since they would not lose out on any employment or con-
sumption benefit and would be free of the risks that would oth-
221. This example is inspired by a real-life case in which the chemical runoff from pulp
and paper mills posed a risk of death to recreational and subsistence anglers who fished in
the streams into which the mills deposited their chemicals. See generally National Emis-
sion Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Produc-
tion; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Perfor-
mance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504 (Apr. 15,
1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63, 261, 430).
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erwise be imposed on them. The activity and its risks are there-
fore not justifiable to such a non-benefitting risk-bearer in the
same way that they are justifiable to a risk-bearer who benefits
from the activity.
Might they be justifiable in some other way? Recall that, under
ex ante contractualism, each fisherman's burden is based not on
the actual death that some unlucky fishermen are expected to
suffer, but rather on the very small risk of death that each affect-
ed fisherman faces. The burden that the cessation of television
manufacturing would place on a worker at a television factory
(the certainty of at least temporary unemployment) plausibly
outweighs the burden that a very small risk of death places on a
fisherman. Indeed, it seems intuitively clear that if the choice is
between imposing the burden of a 1 in 1000 risk of death on a
single fisherman and imposing the burden of certain job loss on a
single worker, equity might well require imposing the risk on the
fisherman. It is plausibly the lesser burden. It would follow that
no risk-bearing fisherman could reasonably reject a principle
permitting television manufacturing. If that is so, then, when
regulated to the point of maximum feasibility, television manu-
facturing would be defensible from the standpoint of ex ante con-
tractualism even if its risks fell entirely on people who derive no
benefit from the activity.
However, this type of ex ante contractualist justification-one
not based on a claim that the risk imposition works to the ex ante
advantage of everyone subject to the risk22-seems to carry sig-
nificantly less weight in combatting a welfarist judgment that the
risk imposition in question is morally impermissible. If those
placed at risk do not benefit from the risk imposition, a risk of
death is really being imposed on them for the benefit of someone
else. The ex ante contractualist justification for a risk imposition
of this type seems quite vulnerable to being overridden by consid-
erations of overall well-being where the risk in question, though
very small in magnitude, is imposed on a sufficiently large group
of people to be expected to cause one or more deaths. In a case
where risk-bearers benefit from the risk imposition, the force of
the welfarist objection to the risk imposition is almost entirely
222. Frick calls these sorts of risk impositions "competitive at the ex ante stage." See
Frick, supra note 106, at 213. They are competitive in the sense that the risk imposition
will necessarily work to the disadvantage of some person or persons ex ante.
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blunted by the fact that the risk imposition is to each risk-
bearer's advantage ex ante. To the family of the unlucky televi-
sion factory worker killed when a very small workplace risk ma-
terializes, one can justify the risk imposition on the grounds that
preventing the death would have required shutting down the ac-
tivity that provided the worker with a livelihood. From an ex ante
standpoint, the ill-fated worker could not rationally have wished
for that to occur.
This sort of justification is not available in the case of the sub-
sistence fishermen. To the family of the unlucky fisherman killed
when a very small risk posed by chemical waste from the televi-
sion factory materializes, all that can be said is that, from an ex
ante perspective, the risk posed by the activity of television man-
ufacturing burdened the fisherman to a lesser extent than the ac-
tivity's discontinuation would have burdened someone else (say, a
worker at a television factory). This justification seems to carry
less force in counteracting a welfarist judgment that the fisher-
man's life-and the lives of similarly situated fishermen-were,
in a net loss to overall well-being, impermissibly sacrificed in or-
der to provide employment and nonessential consumption bene-
fits to millions.
It seems, then, that risky industrial activities with two fea-
tures may often turn out not to be socially beneficial in the plu-
ralistic, all-things-considered sense specified above. The two fea-
tures are: (i) the activity does not save lives or prevent serious
illnesses; and (ii) the activity's risks fall, to a significant extent,
on persons who derive no benefit from the activity. As noted
above, if the activity is not all-things-considered beneficial when
regulated to the point of maximum feasibility, then the activity is
morally impermissible and should be shut down.223
3. Response to Objections
This line of reasoning forms the basis of a response to the ob-
jection that feasibility regulation unjustifiably underregulates
223. This finding suggests that one way a risky activity might be made morally per-
missible in these circumstances would be for the industry engaging in the activity to offer
to compensate all risk-bearers ex ante for the risk that is being imposed on them. If, for
example, the television manufacturing company were to offer every affected fisherman an
annual stipend roughly equivalent to the annual salary of a worker at the television facto-
ry, many fishermen might rationally choose to accept that offer rather than exercise their
"moral veto" over the activity's continuation.
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relative to CBA. The feasibility point is supposed to represent he
maximum level of regulation an industry can tolerate without
seeing its existence or competitive stability threatened. To re-
quire that an industry achieve a greater-than-feasible level of
regulation is, therefore, to require that the industry effectively
shut down, taking with it the social benefits it provides. The un-
derregulation objection to feasibility regulation necessarily im-
plies that if a cost-justified regulation would bankrupt an indus-
try, then it should be allowed to fail. That may be a price worth
paying when, at the feasible level of regulation, the industry is
not all-things-considered beneficial. But it is not desirable when,
at the feasible though suboptimal level of regulation, the industry
is all-things-considered beneficial.
This defense of the feasibility ceiling is, of course, a qualified
one in the sense that it holds the feasibility ceiling to be norma-
tively defensible only if the industry in question, when regulated
to the feasibility point, delivers an all-things-considered social
benefit. On this view, an industry's preservation is not an inde-
pendent good to be valued for its own sake. On the contrary, in-
dustries are worth preserving in virtue of the social benefits they
provide. If a risky industrial activity cannot be made commercial-
ly viable without imposing social costs and risks that outweigh
the activity's social benefits, there would seem to be no sound
normative basis for engaging in the activity.2 4 In other words, all-
things-considered beneficialness should operate as a normative
side constraint on risk regulation.
Undoubtedly, it may be difficult to determine whether an in-
dustrial activity considered as a whole delivers a net social bene-
fit in a welfarist or contractualist sense."' All of the activity's
benefits-including those associated with consumption, employ-
ment, and ownership-would need to be weighed against all of its
224. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAw, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
213 (2002) ("Might the FAA choose to interpret an ambiguous statute so as to impose an
air quality regulation that would not be feasible for the air tour industry over the Grand
Canyon, so that the relevant companies could not stay in business?... The agency might
believe that it is more important to reduce noise levels than to allow the continued opera-
tion of the air tour industry.").
225. Cf. Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 11, at 741 ("Negligence has never
been widely and effectively applied at what economists call the 'activity level.' Courts may
sometimes be able to make well-founded judgments that an activity's benefits do not justi-
fy the harm that is its price, but it seems unlikely that they will be able to do so routine-
ly.").
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costs and risks-to human health, to human quality of life, and to
the environment. This may involve difficult questions of measur-
ability, quantification, and incommensurability. However, when
evaluating risk regulation from a normative point of view, it is
difficult to escape the necessity of answering activity-level ques-
tions of this type.
CONCLUSION
Though feasibility analysis originated nearly half a century ago
during the heyday of environmental legislation in the United
States, it stands today as the principal alternative to cost-benefit
analysis. President Obama has recently relied on his authority
under one of the chief statutory embodiments of the feasibility
approach-the Clean Air Act of 1970-to issue a series of new
regulations aimed at curbing fossil fuel emissions.226 At the center
of legal challenges to these recent regulations lies the same fun-
damental question at issue between CBA and feasibility analysis:
how and to what extent regulators ought to consider economic
costs when regulating hazardous ubstances and emissions that
pose serious risks to human health.
2 7
This article has articulated and defended a novel normative
justification for feasibility-based regulation. Without denying the
relevance of overall well-being to the normative analysis of risk
regulation, it is ultimately the norm of equity that underlies and
justifies the feasibility approach. Equity, interpreted as ex ante
contractualism, provides a compelling basis for responding to the
normative critique of feasibility regulation mounted by advocates
of CBA. Though the feasibility approach may pose significant
challenges of specification and implementation, it is normatively
sound and deserves the prominent place it occupies in the federal
regulation of risks to human health.
226. President Obama has recently used the authority of the Clean Air Act to enact
tougher regulations of hazardous substances like ozone, mercury, and methane. See Coral
Davenport, Obama Builds Environmental Legacy with 1970 Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/without-passing-a-single-law-obama-crafts-
bold-enviornmental-policy.html?..r=0.
227. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding EPA interpreted
a section of the Clean Air Act unreasonably "when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision
to regulate power plants").
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